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Abstract
Essays on Paid Family Leave in the United States
by
Beila R. Leboeuf
Advisor: Professor Wim Vijverberg
This dissertation consists of three chapters.
Chapter 1 The first chapter is a literature survey that reviews the empirical research con-
ducted on paid family leave in the United States. This chapter summarizes the documented
benefits of paid family leave on women’s labor force participation, leave usage, and chil-
dren’s health. Also, evidence that suggests potentially harmful effects of paid family leave
is discussed. Possible directions for future research are explored, and the chapter concludes
by considering the implementation of a national paid family leave program in the United
States.
Chapter 2 The second chapter replicates and extends the results of Rossin-Slater et al.
(2013). The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, validating the results of a study that is
the foundation of the literature on paid family leave in the U.S. is worthwhile in its own right.
Second, extending the work of Rossin-Slater et al. by including later years of data allows
me to examine the robustness of the results over time. Third, examining the robustness of
Rossin-Slater et al.’s work to the choice of other estimation models, bolsters their findings.
Furthermore, by extending the analysis to other states that have implemented paid family
leave programs (namely New Jersey and Rhode Island), I present evidence that bolsters my
claim that California’s paid family leave program (CA-PFL) generates stronger effects than
v
New Jersey’s program (NJ-PFL) or Rhode Island’s (RI-PFL), supporting the decision to
focus my empirical investigation in Chapter 3 on CA-PFL alone. This chapter also examines
the impact of CA-PFL on women’s labor force participation at the extensive margin.
Chapter 3 The third chapter estimates the impact of CA-PFL on women’s years of school-
ing and fertility, arguing that CA-PFL is a source of exogenous variation in expectations
about future labor force participation for women. If in the absence of paid leave, child-
bearing and childrearing can lead a mother to reduce or even terminate her time at work
by dropping out of the labor force, then California’s policy may change expectations about
career span. In this chapter, I sketch out a model that shows that the theoretical impact of
paid family leave on labor force participation is ambiguous. In addition to addressing the
policy debate on whether paid family leave can impact women’s educational outcomes and
career choices, this study contributes to the literature on the effects of paid leave, and more
specifically, on the small literature analyzing the effects of CA-PFL. Much of the research
conducted on this policy thus far has focused on its impact on labor force participation
(Rossin-Slater et al., 2013, Baum and Ruhm, 2016) and maternal health (Rossin, 2011). I
contribute to this literature by exploring the possibility that the program induces increases
in schooling investments and impacts the fertility decision. I find that CA-PFL delays, but
overall increases, educational investments of young women in California.
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Chapter 1
Paid Family Leave in the United
States
1.1 Introduction
The United States is the only developed country without a national paid family leave (PFL)
program. While several states have passed their own PFL programs, and while some employ-
ers independently choose to provide their employees with PFL, only 14 percent of individuals
in the United States have access to PFL (Isaacs et al., 2017). Inadequate PFL availability in
the United States stands in stark contrast to PFL availability in nearly every other country
around the world. Table 11 shows the cross-country variation in family leave policies for a
handful of countries.
Although being the last of the advanced economies not to offer PFL does not in itself
imply that the United States has somehow neglected to advance a beneficial policy, the
mounting evidence on the potential benefits of PFL indicates that the U.S. may have much
to gain by implementing a national PFL program. In assessing the appeal of a national PFL
1This table is based on Table 1 of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017).
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Table 1.1: Cross-country Variation in Paid Family Leave





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain 166 16 63 16 100
France 162 16 38 42/110a 44.7
Germany 162 14 43 58 73.4
Finland 161.03 17.5 29 161.03 26.5
Norway 91 13 23 91 50
Sweden 85 15.6 45 60 63.4
United Kingdom 70 52 21 39 31.3
Greece 60.33 43 19 43 53.9
Japan 58 14 43 58 61.6
Australia 52 6 100 18 42
Canada 52 17 47 52 52.6
Denmark 50 18 22 50 54.1
Italy 47.7 21.7 18 47.7 52.7
Netherlands 42 16 38 16 100
United States 12 0 0 0 0
aThe authors cite the following data sources in compiling this table: Columns (1) to (5): OECD, Family Database, Public
policies for families and children (PF), indicator “PF2.5 Trends in parental leave policies since 1970.”
bAdditional notes by Olivetti and Petrongolo: Column (1): Maximum number of weeks of employment-protected parental leave
available to mothers, regardless of income support. This is the sum of weeks of maternity leave, parental leave, and home care
of children. Column (2): Total number of weeks of maternity leave available to employed women, regardless of income support.
These are defined as employment-protected leaves of absence for employed women around the time of childbirth, or adoption
(in some countries). Column (3): Percentage of total weeks of maternity leave that a woman is allowed to take before the
expected date of childbirth. Column (4): Total number of weeks for which a mother can receive payments from the benefit
attached to or associated with parental leave, regardless of the period of employment protection. Column (5): The “average
payment rate” is the proportion of previous earnings replaced by the benefit over the length of the paid leave entitlement for a
person earning 100% of average national (2014) earnings. If this covers more than one period of leave at two different payment
rates, a weighted average is calculated based on the length of each period. Sample period is 2015. In column (4), two statistics
are reported for France. The first number refers to families with one child, the second to families with two children.
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program, the question of how PFL impacts women’s labor force participation is central.
Furthermore, assessing the impact of PFL on other factors such as maternal and children’s
health outcomes as well as the potential role that PFL may play as a social and economic
equalizer by reducing inequalities in access to and usage of PFL, can inform the decision to
implement such a program. In an effort to evaluate the potential merit of a national PFL
program in the U.S., I review the empirical evidence pertaining to these important questions,
and explore other potential intended as well as unintended consequences of PFL.
In reviewing the empirical work that has been conducted on PFL in the U.S., I focus on
California’s paid family leave program (CA-PFL). This is for two reasons. First, CA-PFL is
the first, and to date, most generous PFL program in the United States. Second, probably
due to the first reason, nearly all of the empirical work on PFL in the U.S. has focused on
CA-PFL.
1.2 Paid Family Leave in the United States
Although the U.S. does not have a national PFL program, in 1993, the U.S. Congress passed
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), its first and only federal legislated leave, which
provides eligible women employed at covered firms with 12 weeks of unpaid job-protected
leave. In order to qualify for this leave provision, women must have worked at least 1,250
hours in the previous year and be employed by a firm that employs at least 50 employees
within a 75-mile radius. These stringent requirements result in low coverage for women;
only about half of private sector employees and only about a fifth of new mothers in the
U.S. are covered (Ruhm, 2011). Several states had passed some form of unpaid leave prior
to the FMLA, and several extended FMLA eligibility requirements so that availability of
unpaid leave varied across states before and after the FMLA. In addition, in 1978, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act was passed, requiring states that had previously offered paid
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benefits for disability related time off to provide up to 52 weeks of partially paid leave for
pregnancy-related disabilities as well. Thus, the five states (New York, Jew Jersey, Rhode
Island, California, and Hawaii) that had implemented Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI)
programs earlier in the 1940s-1960s, extended benefits to cover women with pregnancy-
related disabilities. However, this type of leave is not always job-protected, which means
that if a mother is covered by this policy alone, she may not be guaranteed her previous job
upon her return from taking leave.
In 2002, California became the first state to pass legislation mandating paid family leave.
In 2004, California’s paid family-leave program (CA-PFL) was implemented, offering em-
ployees up to six weeks of partially paid leave, at a replacement rate of 55 percent. The
replacement rate was increased in 2018 to approximately 60 to 70 percent2, up to a weekly
maximum of $1,216. The paid leave program was designed to extend California’s State
Disability Insurance (SDI, previously called TDI) program, and is financed by an employee
payroll-tax system. Like the TDI program, CA-PFL does not provide job-protection. How-
ever, employees who are also eligible for job-protected (but unpaid) leave under FMLA
can apply for paid leave under CA-PFL, and use the benefits in conjunction with the job-
protection covered by FMLA. In addition, new mothers can file for 6 weeks of paid leave
under disability insurance (with the certification of her physician) and for an additional 6
weeks of benefits under paid leave. However, the two may not be used together (i.e., the
mother may file for both but can only be in one of the programs at a time.3)
Since then, a handful of other states have passed their own PFL programs. Washington
passed a PFL program in 2007, but it was not implemented due to budgetary constraints.
2The replacement rate depends on earnings in the base period. If highest quarterly earnings are less than
$928.99, the weekly benefit amount is $50. If highest quarterly earnings are between $929 and $5,385.37, the
weekly benefit amount is about 70 percent of earnings. If highest quarterly earnings are more than $5,385.37,
the weekly benefit amount is about 60 percent of earnings. See the State of California EDD website for more
information: https://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/calculating pfl benefit payment amounts.htm
3This information was provided by California’s Employment Development Department through email com-
munication that took place on December 14, 2015.
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The law was recently updated in 2017 and will go into effect in 2020, offering up to 12 weeks
of paid leave (plus 2 more for complicated pregnancies), with a replacement rate of up to
90 percent, up to a weekly maximum of $1,000. The program will be funded by employee
and employer contributions. In 2009, New Jersey passed a PFL program offering up to 6
weeks of paid leave at up to 67 percent of income, up to a weekly maximum of $524. The
program is funded by employee contributions to a temporary disability fund. In 2014, Rhode
Island passed a PFL program offering up to 4 weeks of paid leave at a weekly maximum of
$752. The program is also funded by employee contributions to a temporary disability fund.
New York also passed a PFL program in 2016, which recently went into effect in January
of 2018. The program offers up to 8 weeks of paid leave at a replacement rate of about 50
percent (set to increase over time to up to 67 percent by 2021), up to a weekly maximum of
$652.96. This program is also funded by employee contributions to a temporary disability
fund. Lastly, Washington D.C. passed a PFL program in 2017 which will be implemented
in 2020, offering up to 8 weeks of paid leave at up to 90 percent of income, up to a weekly
maximum of $1,000. The program is funded by employer and employee contributions.
Currently, five states and the nation’s capital have passed PFL programs. However,
the program best suited to an empirical study is California’s. This is true for two reasons.
First, California’s program went into effect fourteen years ago. This allows for considerable
post-policy data which facilitate empirical work on the policy’s effects. There is a concern
that there is a lag in awareness of the policy and that, as a result, the researcher may not
detect behavioral changes immediately after implementation. Additional years of data can
mitigate this problem, and thus having sufficient post-policy data is key to conducting a
rigorous study of the program’s effects. Second, California’s program is the most generous
of the programs that have already gone into effect. Washington state and Washington
D.C. have both committed to more generous benefits but these programs have not yet been
implemented. Thus, estimated effects of CA-PFL can be seen as an upper bound; because
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other existing programs are less generous, their effects are likely to be smaller.
1.3 The Effects of Paid Family Leave
Research on the effects of PFL has focused on a number of outcomes. Most of this research
has focused on programs outside of the U.S., but an increasing number of studies have
examined the effects of California’s PFL program. While the studies examining the effects
of PFL in other countries may have limited external validity for the U.S. case, taken together,
this body of research may still serve as a starting point to guide predictions on the potential
effects of PFL programs in the U.S.
1.3.1 Women’s Labor Force Participation
One of the most researched consequences of PFL is its impact on women’s labor force par-
ticipation. Proponents of PFL often invoke the possible benefits of PFL on women’s labor
force attachment and labor force participation. However, theoretically, the effect of PFL
on women’s labor force participation is ambiguous. Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) provide
some intuition on the theoretical effect of PFL on labor force participation. In the absence
of any maternity leave statute, a mother’s desired4 length of leave will depend on her current
wage and utility from staying home with her child. In this case, the mother can either forgo
her desired length of leave to stay with her employer and continue earning her current wage,
or she can quit her job to take leave, and then rejoin the labor force at the end of the leave
period or not at all. As Klerman and Leibowitz indicate, mothers with higher job-specific
human capital, “rarer” jobs, and higher wages are less likely to choose the latter alternative
because these mothers stand to lose more in foregone wages and would accrue higher job-
4I use the word “desired” to refer to the amount of leave the mother would wish to take given no restrictions
on leave duration, i.e., the amount of leave that is optimal for a given mother maximizing her utility function
subject to a budget contraint in a world where she can take as much leave as she chooses.
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search costs (“rare” jobs may be more challenging to find). In the presence of a maternity
leave statute, a mother’s decision becomes more complex: Her desired leave length is now
constrained by a leave allowance (either paid or unpaid) provided by her employer. If the
leave allowance is greater than or equal to the mother’s desired leave duration, then the
mother will go on leave and return at the end of her leave. (This obviously becomes more
complicated if the leave is unpaid and the mother cannot afford to forgo pay for the duration
of the leave period. If the leave allowance is less than the mother’s preferred leave, then the
mother has two choices: She may either keep her job by choosing the shorter leave offered
by her employer, or she may quit her job and take the full amount of desired leave (and then
perhaps find a new job later on). Klerman and Leibowitz show that under certain conditions,
women will be indifferent between staying with a current employer and quitting to take the
amount of leave preferred and then searching for a new employer afterwards. Under other
conditions, the authors show that women will choose to take the shorter leave and stay with
their pre-birth employers. In other words, the model does not provide definitive predictions
regarding the impact of PFL on women’s labor force participation.
However, turning to empirical studies conducted on PFL in the U.S., the evidence indi-
cates a positive impact on labor force participation, job-continuity, and wages. The research
conducted thus far on PFL in the U.S. has focused on CA-PFL. Proponents of PFL argue
that in its absence, some women may be forced to drop out of the labor force because al-
though they would like to bond with newborns, they cannot take time off to do so. Moreover,
since PFL may foster better relationships between employees with children and employers,
it may increase job-continuity. Recent research by Byker (2016) uses a DID model and an
event study approach to show that CA-PFL (and NJ-PFL) was successful in increasing labor
force attachment for women in the time periods before and following a birth.
Both Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) and Baum and Ruhm (2016) test for employment and
wage effects of CA-PFL. Rossin-Slater et al. find that CA-PFL resulted in small increases in
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labor force participation at the intensive margin (although results are not all statistically sig-
nificant). In other words, they find that conditional on some employment, CA-PFL raised
hours worked in the reference week by 6 to 10 percent for mothers. The authors cannot
identify whether women are going back to former employers which prevents them for pro-
viding conclusive evidence on job-continuity. However, the authors report in a footnote that
they also do not find labor supply changes at the extensive margin (i.e., in the probability
of employment) so they interpret the results as consist with job-continuity where women
increase number of hours worked because of retained human capital. They also find slight
wage increases although these are not statistically significant and may be explained by the
increase in work hours.
Baum and Ruhm find that CA-PFL is associated with higher employment rates 9 to 12
months after birth. They also find that CA-PFL increases the number of hours worked for
mothers. Unlike Rossin-Slater et al., Baum and Ruhm are able to examine whether women
return to former employers; they find mixed results indicating that for some women, PFL
may encourage them to stay on the job longer in order to qualify for benefits and then
subsequently return to the same employer.
The analyses in both Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) and Baum and Ruhm (2016) comple-
ment each other by investigating the same questions on two different data sets (the Current
Population Survey and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth), each having its advantages
and disadvantages. Together they indicate that PFL may have positive effects for women by
increasing labor force participation at the intensive margin and potentially increasing wages
as well.
Drawing on the international evidence on the effects of PFL on women’s labor force
participation, results show mixed effects, but taken together do lend some support to the
hypothesis that PFL positively impacts women’s labor force participation. For example,
Ruhm (1998) uses data from nine European countries from 1969 through 1993 to show that
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access to PFL raises the female employment-to-population (EP) ratio by 3 to 4 percent.
This increase in female EP ratios comes at a cost (because Ruhm also finds that women’s
wages suffer in the presence of extended maternity leave benefits) but the finding nevertheless
supports a positive relationship between access to paid leave and labor force participation.
Schonberg and Ludsteck (2014) exploit variation induced by five major expansions in ma-
ternity leave coverage in Germany to analyze the effect of paid leave on women’s labor force
participation. Between 1979 and 1993, Germany implemented 5 maternity leave expansions
which over the course of the expansions expanded maternity leave from 2 months to 3 years.
Using a DID model, Schonberg and Ludsteck compare labor market outcomes of mothers
giving birth before the maternity leave expansion and after, using mothers giving birth in
years where no expansion occurred as a control. They find that in the short run, maternity
leave coverage delayed women’s return to work, thereby reducing maternal employment in
the short run. They also find that although four of the five expansions had no impact on
long-term labor force participation of mothers, the reform that extended benefits from 6 to
22 months discouraged up to 4 percent of mothers from returning to work by their child’s
sixth birthday. The authors use this evidence, combined with their findings for negative ef-
fects in the short run, to argue that the expansions of maternity leave coverage in Germany
had a negative effect on women’s employment outcomes.
Other studies that look at the effects of PFL on labor force participation in countries
outside of the U.S. (see, for example, Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017) generally find consistent
results; longer PFL programs can have negative effects on women’s employment and some
studies also find a negative impact on wages (Rossin-Slater, 2017). Although there may be
limited external validity to studies examining PFL in other countries, the evidence across the
board indicates that for leave periods of the length currently implemented in state programs
in the U.S. and others being considered in the U.S. (i.e., 4 to 14 weeks of PFL), it is unlikely
that labor force partiicpation and wages would suffer. The budding literature estimating the
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effects of policies in the U.S. supports this conclusion.
1.3.2 Leave Usage
One of the arguments in favor of paid family leave in the U.S. hinges on the inadequacy
of unpaid leave offered under the FMLA because of inequalities in uptake rates. Klerman,
Daley, and Pozniak (2012) report that 46 percent of women who claim an “unmet need” for
leave cite the inability to take unpaid time off as the leading cause. Furthermore, nearly half
of women in the U.S. are not even eligible for leave under FMLA because they either do not
work for a covered firm and/or do not meet the stringent eligibility requirements (Ruhm,
1997).5 In addition, the surveys conducted by Eileen Appelbaum and Ruth Milkman in
2004, 2011, and 2013 paint a picture in which disadvantaged women are significantly less
likely to have access to any type of leave under FMLA or workplace policies. In their 2004
survey, the authors find that 32 percent of workers employed by establishments that have at
least 25 percent of their employees earning $9 an hour or less, are provided with family leave
benefits beyond what is required by the law. On the other hand, the same survey shows that
nearly 65 percent of workers employed by establishments that have no employees earning $9
an hour or less are provided with such benefits. The results in the 2011 survey corroborate
those from the 2004 survey; 4.1 percent of workers with a salary below $10 an hour work
for an employer that provides paid vacation or sick days, compared to nearly 54 percent of
those earning above $20 an hour. Other policy reports (Fass, 2009, Institute for Women’s
Policy Research, 2014, and Winston, 2014) present findings that point in the same direction,
and indicate that the U.S lacks policies that allow women to take time off upon the birth of
a child.
The lack of PFL in the U.S. imposes a burden on new mothers; women may have to
5It should be noted that some of the stringency in FMLA eligibility (for example, the law applies to employers
with more than 50 employees within a 75-mile radius) is meant to protect small businesses from burdensome
regulations.
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take unpaid leave at the cost of lost wages or drop out of the labor force entirely, either
temporarily or permanently. Also, in the absence of PFL, women may have fewer career
prospects if employers don’t promote leave-taking women, or if dropping out of the workforce
even temporarily causes skills to depreciate. In fact, the wage gap, which is often attributed
to discrimination by advocacy groups, may be due at least in part to a “motherhood wage
penalty” (Waldfogel, 1997). Furthermore, even for women who have access to unpaid leave,
many cannot afford to forgo earnings for the duration of the leave, making it difficult for
women to take leave (Klerman, Daley, and Pozniak, 2012). One of the reasons proponents of
PFL advocate paid leave programs is precisely to minimize this type of unequal leave usage.
The literature examining the effects of CA-PFL indicates that the program may have
somewhat reduced inequalities in access to leave. Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) investigate this
point using CPS data on women with infants in California. Using a DID methodology, they
find that relative to mothers with older children in California, CA-PFL nearly doubles leave-
taking by new mothers. Specifically, they find that the policy is followed by a 6 percentage
point increase in leave-taking, which on a pre-treatment base of 5.4 percent implies an
increase of over 110 percent. Rossin-Slater et al.’s analysis is the first to show in the U.S.
that if new mothers taking time off after childbirth is a worthwhile goal (perhaps for mother’s
health and mother’s job-continuity as well as early childhood investments), then PFL may be
effective in meeting this goal. Baum and Ruhm (2016) provide corroborating evidence using
data from the NLSY-79; they find that CA-PFL raised leave-taking by about 2.4 weeks.
This result is comparable to the one in Rossin-Slater et al. However, a more recent study
conducted by Bana et al. (2018) finds that even by 2014, women in the lowest quartile
of earnings are still very much underrepresented in CA-PFL claims. Taken together, these
studies show that while CA-PFL may have been effective in increasing leave-taking, it did
not completely eliminate disparities in use of PFL.
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1.3.3 Health Effects
Another commonly made argument in favor of PFL is that leave-taking can have positive
effects on children. For example, Appelbaum and Milkman (2011) and Huang and Yang
(2015) find that California’s PFL program may have led to increased breastfeeding rates.
This can have important implications for maternal and infant health and can have a beneficial
impact on children’s attachment and emotional well-being. Also, Berger et al. (2005) find
strong correlations between mother’s early return to work and reductions in breastfeeding,
timely child well-visits, immunizations, and also behavioral problems. Their results provide
additional evidence on a causal relationship between returning to work full-time within 12
weeks after childbirth and negative outcomes for children, indicating that PFL may be able
to mitigate some of these negative effects.
Examining Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs in the U.S., Stearns (2015)
find positive health effects of paid leave. The Pregnancy and Discrimination Act of 1978
required that states include pregnancy as a covered disability. Thus, the five states with TDI
programs (California, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Hawaii) all began covering
pregnancy under TDI. The author uses a DID approach, comparing birth outcomes within
states before and after the implementation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and finds
that availability of paid leave in the TDI states reduced the share of low birth weight birth
by 3.2 percent and decreased the likelihood of early term birth by 6.6 percent.
Furthermore, positive health effects of PFL may extend into later years; Lichtman-Sadot
and Pillay Bell (2017) find that the introduction of PFL in California led to improved
improvements in health outcomes for California elementary school children. In other words,
the authors show that children born after the implementation of CA-PFL in 2004 had lower
risks of being overweight, having hearing problems, and were less likely to be diagnosed with
ADHD.
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Turning to evidence from studies on programs outside of the U.S., the results are mixed.
For example, Baker and Milligan (2010) examine an expansion from about 6 to 12 months
of PFL in Canada. They find that although mothers who took leave spent more time not
working in the year after childbirth, effects of the expansion on early-childhood (up to 24
months) cognitive and behavioral development (such as measures of temperament, motor
and social development) are small and statistically insignificant. In a follow up study, Baker
and Milligan (2015) examine cognitive and noncognitive development at ages 4 and 5 and
find no impact of PFL. However, it should be noted that the studies by Baker and Milligan on
Canada all examine extensions in maternity leave usage and not the initial implementation
of a PFL policy. It is possible that while further increasing already-generous PFL benefits
may have little to no effects on children’s outcomes, introducing PFL in a location where
previously there was no PFL statute may still lead to improved outcomes.
1.3.4 Possible Harmful Effects of PFL
In spite of the benefits attributed to PFL, critics have raised concerns regarding implement-
ing such programs. The primary concern is that by requiring employers to provide PFL,
employers may discriminate against women in the hiring process. In other words, although
PFL encompasses more than maternity leave, relative to men women are significantly more
likely to take PFL (Bana et al., 2018), and therefore, employers may anticipate women hires
being more costly than male hires and may respond by hiring fewer women relative to men.6
This form of statistical discrimination could impose a serious burden on women in the labor
force. The first (and to date only) study examining this (Sarin, 2016) indicates that PFL
may indeed have led to statistical discrimination. The author uses a DID model within a re-
gression discontinuity design that exploits the fact that individuals using the PFL programs
6Note that this can happen even if PFL is funded by employee payroll taxes because employers will still face
costs in hiring and training replacement employees.
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in California and New Jersey only have guaranteed job-protection if working for employers
with 50 or more employees, to show that PFL in conjunction with job protection leads to
about 1.15 percent fewer female hires in large firms relative to small firms not offering job
protection. Sarin interprets this result as an indication that job-protected leave is more costly
to employers and therefore results in negative hiring outcomes for women, particularly for
women of childbearing age and for women in industries that are relatively less human-capital
intensive. Note that this makes sense because employees in less human-capital intensive jobs
are easier to replace and employers may have a particularly hard time when forced to hold
jobs for employees on leave. Furthermore, while there is no rigorous research on this, it
is possible that employers, anticipating that female hires may be more costly, may offer
lower wages. However, if PFL does have positive effects on women’s labor-force attachment
and job-continuity, employers may recognize that PFL may, in the grand scheme, encourage
capable women to stay on the job, and this may mitigate the effects of hiring discrimination
Another point that has been raised in evaluating the consequences of PFL in the U.S.
is its effect on unemployment. On the one hand, if forcing employers to provide female
employees with paid leave is costly, then paid leave may decrease the demand for female
employees. (Although PFL programs are intended for both male and female employees,
women are more likely to use these programs and employers are likely aware of this.) On
the other hand, PFL may make it easier for women to both work and have children and
as such may increase labor force participation. (It is possible for these two effects to offset
each other; if PFL increases mother’s job-retention, then this may reduce employers’ costs
because they only need to replace the new mother while she is temporarily on leave.) Das
and Polachek (2015) investigate the effect of CA-PFL on unemployment. Using a DID
methodology, they find that paid leave increased the unemployment rate for young women
in California by 5 percent, relative to older California women and all women in the rest of the
U.S. They also find that unemployment duration for young women in California increased
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by 0.729 weeks as a result of CA-PFL. In explaining their findings, Das and Polachek argue
that the introduction of paid leave in California had unanticipated “general equilibrium”
effects which simultaneously increase women’s labor supply and decrease demand for female
labor, thereby resulting in higher unemployment. This result is interesting because it is the
first to show potentially negative effects of CA-PFL. Thus, it seems that while CA-PFL may
have resulted in raising leave-taking and labor force participation, Das and Polachek’s work
suggests that these changes may have occurred at a cost by raising unemployment.
1.4 Future Research on Paid Family Leave
1.4.1 Can PFL Affect the Decision to Work?
While research has shown that access to PFL can increase labor force attachment and par-
ticipation for women, a feature of paid leave that has not yet been adequately addressed is
its impact on a woman’s labor supply at the extensive margin.7 This margin is arguably
more interesting because in the absence of a widespread PFL program, disadvantaged women
(characterized as minority young women with less education and lower income) are less likely
to have access to PFL benefits than their advantaged counterparts (Appelbaum and Milk-
man, 2011, Bana et al., 2018). Furthermore, even in the absence of PFL, advantaged women
may be able to take unpaid time off in lieu of PFL but disadvantaged women may not be able
to forgo pay and may be forced to choose between economic security and the well-being of
their children and families. Thus, juggling childbirth and work may be particularly difficult
for disadvantaged women and this may contribute to disadvantaged women being pushed out
of the labor force. Estimating the impact of PFL on labor supply at the extensive margin
could shed light on the full effects of PFL on labor force participation.
7The extensive margin refers to the participation margin. In other words, the binary decision to be in or stay
out of the labor force.
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Furthermore, the effect of PFL on the decision to be in or out of the labor force is
interesting because PFL could lower the opportunity cost of working by allowing mothers to
maintain a career without having to sacrifice the needs of their families, particularly those
of their children during early childhood. It is possible that certain women will choose to
stay home independent of workplace characteristics, inspired by traditional family values or
income security provided by a spouse. Thus, for these women, PFL is not expected to affect
their labor supply. However, for women who do not have strong preferences for staying
home, but rather choose to do so because of the difficulties inherent in being a working
mother, the introduction of PFL may increase the likelihood of working for this group of
women. The mechanism through which this may occur is as follows: PFL allows women to
pursue a career without the threat of having to quit working upon the arrival of a child or
an unexpected family crisis, thus increasing the horizon over which women can expect to
stay employed and possibly increasing job security. Furthermore, access to PFL represents
a step in the direction towards a more family-friendly workplace and as such may increase
women’s confidence in the ability to be successful working mother.
To fully motivate the potential role of PFL in mother’s decision to work, it is useful to
start by considering the characteristics of mothers who stay home and consider the reasons
for which they choose to stay home. Kreider and Elliott (2010) provide an overview of the
changing characteristics of stay-at-home moms over the years from 1969 to 2009. Using
CPS data on married women with children under age 15 at home in 1969, 1979, 1989,
1999, and 2009, the authors find a sharp decrease in the probability of being a stay-at-home
mother in each subsequent year, relative to 1969. This trend reverses in 2009; the authors
note that in 1999, 24 percent of married mothers in their sample are stay-at-home whereas
this proportion increases to 26 percent in 2009. Other reports observe a similar trend in
rising numbers of stay-at-home mothers since 1999, looking at a broader group of mothers
characterized as stay-at-home (see for example Stone, 2008, and Pew Research Foundation,
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2014). Kreider and Elliot also find that relative to previous years, stay-at-home mothers in
2009 are younger, less educated, and more likely to be Hispanic.8 Furthermore, they find that
compared to previous years, younger, less educated, and Hispanic mothers are more likely
to stay home, suggesting that the changing composition of stay-at-home mothers in more
recent years cannot necessarily be explained as merely the result of the overall population of
mothers in recent years being younger, less educated, and more likely to be Hispanic. These
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that some stay-at-home mothers may be locked
out of the labor force because of attributes that make it harder for them to find work that
enables them to balance work life and family life simultaneously.
The possibility that women may be locked out of the labor force because of their inability
to juggle work and family is concerning. Exacerbating this concern is the anecdotal evidence
that indicates even career-oriented stay-at-home moms, who are characterized by higher
family incomes and educational attainment, choose to stay home largely because of the lack
of flexibility and family-friendly policies offered by their employers. Stone (2008) conducts
in-depth interviews with professional stay-at-home mothers (highly-educated women who
had professional careers prior to their decision to stay home) to obtain a better understand-
ing of their decisions to opt out of the labor force. Of fifty-four mothers interviewed, Stone
finds that thirty-six plan to return to work, compared to six who do not (almost all of whom
also report traditional views on the role of a mother at home), indicating that most of these
mothers are dissatisfied with life at home and want to work. Furthermore, when asked to
explain the move to stay home, most of the mothers interviewed report workplace inflex-
ibilities and lack of family-friendly policies as primary or secondary factors affecting their
decisions. The Working Mother Research Institute (2011) lends additional support to this
finding. In a survey of 3,781 mothers who self-identify as “career-oriented”, over half report
8They use a logistic model to predict the likelihood of being a stay-at-home mother over time and control for
characteristics.
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they would rather be at work, but are pushed out because of workplace inflexibilities that
are incompatible with family life. Although the experiences of young, uneducated, minority
stay-at-home mothers and those of more older, more educated, non-minority stay-at-home
mothers are not directly comparable, the combination of the two perspectives illustrates a
startling picture; regardless of mothers’ characteristics, the decision to stay home may not
be a first choice but rather the result of insurmountable obstacles faced by mothers trying
to juggle work and family who end up either dropping out of the labor force (opt-out moms
[Belkin, 2003]) or never join altogether. Thus, PFL may provide the additional flexibility
mothers need to juggle life at work and at home.
The literature on the effects of tax policy on women’s labor supply provides a relevant
comparison. This literature has looked at the effects of higher personal income taxes on
women’s labor supply, both at the intensive and extensive margins. Theoretically, tax in-
creases can impact labor force participation because a tax changes incentives to work. A
framework for estimating the effect of taxes on labor supply is presented by Hausman (1985).
The basic model starts off with an individual who must choose between the consumption
of goods and leisure. The individual’s consumption choices are constrained by her income
which is composed of the wages she earns for the number of hours she works (let’s say at a
wage rate of w) and any non-wage income she receives (for example, through investments or
a spouse’s income). Thus, the individual’s problem is to choose the amount of consumption
and leisure that makes her best off, subject to what she can afford. Now, imposing a tax on
the labor income that the individual earns effectively reduces the wage that she receives for
his work. Because the cost of leisure is essentially the wage income that the individual gives
up to enjoy it, this means that the tax effectively lowers the cost of leisure. As a result, two
things occur: The first is that leisure becomes cheaper relative to other consumption goods,
thereby raising the optimal level of leisure for the individual (substitution effect). The second
is that to maintain the same level of income that she was earning before, the individual now
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needs to work more hours, thereby forgoing some leisure (income effect). In other words,
the effect of a tax on income on labor supply can be broken down into two components,
one of which points to lower labor force participation and the other to higher labor force
participation. Thus, theoretically, the impact of taxes on labor supply is ambiguous and will
depend on the relative magnitudes of the two competing effects.
In much the same way, a mother’s consumption choices are constrained by her income
which is affected by PFL. In other words, PFL can increase income for a mother who would
have previously dropped out of the labor force, effectively increasing the mother’s lifetime
income. This will also be true for women who would have stayed employed but would have
taken unpaid leave. In this way, the cost of leisure increases, generating two effects: First,
leisure becomes relatively more expensive, lowering the optimal level of leisure. This could
lead to higher labor force participation (more work). Second, the income effect may lead
to less work as mothers need to work less to earn what they may have previously earned.
Although this means the effect of CA-PFL on labor force participation is theoretically am-
biguous, the evidence from the tax literature and the existing literature on CA-PF on labor
force participation indicates that the substitution effect will be the dominant effect. In other
words, one would expect that CA-PFL would increase women’s labor force participation.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence from the tax literature suggests that women’s labor
force participation may be more responsive at the extensive margin. While most of the liter-
ature finds that at the intensive margin, responsiveness to tax changes for men are negligible,
along the extensive margin, results indicate that labor supply may be more responsive to tax
changes, especially for mothers (Meghir and Phillips, 2010). This makes sense considering
mothers face higher opportunity costs of working because of the costs (both pecuniary and
psychic) of being a working mother. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that responsiveness
is strongly heterogeneous across the population; Meghir and Phillips find that women and
mothers in particular are very sensitive, low-educated men may also be somewhat respon-
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sive, and highly educated individuals (men and women) are not responsive at either margin.
Overall, this research is helpful in guiding research on PFL because it shows that incen-
tives clearly do matter and that responses vary both by the margin considered (intensive or
extensive) and by demographics (e.g. gender and education).9
1.4.2 Can PFL Affect Schooling Investments?
Theoretically, if in the absence of leave childbirth interrupts a woman’s career so that she
drops out of the labor force either temporarily or permanently, a paid family leave program
may raise the woman’s optimal level of schooling by enabling her to stay at work (and go
on leave instead of dropping out). In other words, by minimizing the career interruption
following childbirth, PFL can increase women’s labor force participation over the career
and, thus, make it more worthwhile to invest in education. On the other hand, PFL may
have a negative effect on schooling because whereas in the absence of leave women may
have had to obtain more schooling to qualify for the “good” jobs that would independently
offer leave, a near-universal paid leave program would eliminate the incentive to pursue
more education for this reason. To further motivate the question of how PFL can impact
education, I frame the question by relating it to the literature on the effects of increased
career length (i.e., amount of time in the labor force over a career) on schooling investments.
This literature has examined the effect of an increase in an individual’s life expectancy on
education (presumably driven by an increase in time spent in the labor market).
The causal link between life expectancy and schooling is difficult to estimate because of
the difficulty in finding random variation in life expectancy. To address this issue, Jayachan-
dran and Lleras-Muney (2009) exploit a “natural experiment” in which maternal mortality
in Sri Lanka declined by 70 percent between 1946 and 1953, to estimate the relationship be-
9See also Mroz (1987), Triest (1990) and Eissa (1995, 1996a, 1996b, and 2008) for more empirical evidence in-
dicating that women’s labor supply is quite responsive to taxes, especially along the participation (extensive)
margin.
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tween life expectancy and schooling investments. The authors use a difference-in-difference-
in-difference (DDD) methodology (comparing across districts, gender, and time) to show that
this significant decrease in the risk of dying in childbirth increased female life expectancy by
about 1.5 years during the period that they study. They use this variation in life expectancy
to estimate the effect of the maternal mortality decline on literacy rates; they show that in
1953, younger cohorts exhibit increases in literacy while older cohorts (who presumably have
finished their education and would not have their literacy affected) do not. Furthermore, the
authors aggregate average schooling of individuals in a district, gender, and cohort cell, to
estimate the effect of decreasing maternal mortality on average education (literacy or years of
education) using 1971 data. The authors again find increases in literacy for younger cohorts.
In addition, they show that for each additional expected year of life, education increases by
0.11 years, although these results should be taken as suggestive rather than conclusive given
that the authors document selection issues in the availability of the schooling data.
Although Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney clearly list and address the limitations of their
well-documented story, another reason for which their estimates may not be readily extended
to other contexts is that the change in life expectancy that they exploit is small and based
on expectations. Oster et al. (2013) address this limitation by studying the impact of life
expectancy on human capital investments where the variation in life-expectancy is arguably
more dramatic. More specifically, the authors use data on individuals who are at risk for
Huntington’s disease10 and exploit variation in the “revelation” of the disease to identify the
effect of life expectancy on schooling attainment. They find that earlier onset of symptoms
(in other words, earlier “revelation” that something is potentially wrong) is associated with
10Oster et al. (2013) begin their article by including useful background information on Huntington’s disease
which I include here: “Huntington disease (HD) is a degenerative neurological disorder with onset around
age 40, a life expectancy of around 60, and a healthy life expectancy of 10 years fewer than than. HD is
caused by an inherited expansion in the Huntington gene. Individuals with one parent with HD have a 50
percent chance of inheriting the expanded copy of the gene and developing the disease. Since the early 1990s
a genetic test has been available. This blood DNA test can provide at-risk individuals with certainty about
whether they will develop HD.”
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lower probability of college attendance (for those who experience symptoms between the ages
of 15 and 18) and completion (for those who experience symptoms between the ages of 15 and
28). These results indicate that expecting a shorter life span does lead to reduced investment
in schooling. Furthermore, the authors show that a similar relationship exists between life
expectancy and job training. Taken together, their results indicate that expectations about
life expectancy may indeed drive human capital investment.
While PFL probably does not have a substantial impact on women’s life expectancy, it
can be argued that by providing women with the option to take some time off to recover
from childbirth and bond with a new baby, while still remaining employed, PFL may increase
expectations about career length much in the same way that an increase in life expectancy
does. Thus, investigating the impact of PFL on schooling is an interesting direction for
future research.
1.5 Implementing a National PFL Program in the United
States
1.5.1 Structuring a PFL program
How a national PFL program in the U.S. would be funded is not widely agreed upon and
has played a role in delaying legislation. While increasing payroll taxes is certainly one
possible route, the rising deficit, and the fear of creating another entitlement program has
made policymakers reluctant to go down this path. Senator Rubio (R-Fla) has introduced a
PFL proposal in the Senate in which he suggests financing benefits through Social Security.
In other words, he proposes allowing individuals today to dip into social security funds to
pay for current benefits, and to repay this “loan” by retiring a few months later. While
this is a novel and potentially interesting idea, there has already been some backlash with
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dissenters worrying that such a policy will exacerbate the Social Security crisis. Furthermore,
for mothers having one or two children, delaying retirement by 3 months each time may be
feasible, but for mothers having more children, this can be burdensome.11
In addition to the debate over how a national PFL program would funded, the issue
is further complicated by the question of how to structure such a program; specifically,
the amount of time allowed, the replacement rate offered, and whether the leave should
be job-protected. Ruhm (1998) and Rossin-Slater (2017) review the extensive literature
that confirms that extended periods of leave can negatively affect women’s wages. More
specifically, Ruhm finds that for extended leave periods of more than 9 months, hourly
earnings decrease by 3 percent. Also, Jaumotte (2004) finds that for leave periods beyond
20 weeks, additional leave may weaken labor market skills, career opportunities, and wages,
making it more difficult for mothers to return to work. Furthermore, Stearns (2017) examines
the effects of PFL reforms in Great Britain and finds that job-protection had negative effects
on women’s career advancement, suggesting that job-protection may have unanticipated
harmful effects for women’s employment outcomes (and may exacerbate rather than reduce
the gender gap in high-level professional positions). Taken together, these results suggest that
there may be an optimal duration of leave; leaves less than 12 weeks seem to be correlated
with negative outcomes for children (Berger et al., 2005), but leaves too long can damage
labor force attachment and lower wages. Also, Bana et al. (2018) examine the effect of the
weekly benefit amount on future labor market outcomes and do not find harmful effects of
increased benefits. In fact, the authors document evidence that an increase in the weekly
benefit amount leads to an increase in labor force attachment one to two years after the
11Rubio’s bill proposes increasing the retirement age for those who claim the parental leave benefit by a
function of the leave duration and benefits paid. The new retirement age is the usual retirement age plus
the parental leave benefit adjustment which is calculated as the sum of the adjusted benefit months (i.e.,
the number of months during which the individual took the parental leave, rounded to the nearest whole
month) multiplied by the parental leave benefit ratio applicable for the calendar year in which the parental
leave benefit was received. A “fact sheet” released by Rubio’s office indicates that this will delay retirement
by 3 to 6 months (it is unclear but I assume per birth/leave-taking period).
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leave.
1.5.2 Political Efforts
It has been fourteen years since the first state-level PFL program was implemented, but
the federal government has only recently begun an earnest bipartisan conversation about
organizing a national PFL agenda. President Trump highlighted the importance of PFL
during his 2019 State of the Union address and is the first president to have allocated
funds for a PFL program in his budget. His Administration has voiced a strong interest in
advancing the first federal PFL legislation in the U.S., and Ivanka Trump, Senior Advisor to
the President, has worked closely with policymakers on developing a national PFL agenda.
In her own words, Ivanka Trump’s goal has been to put together an agenda that provides
working parents with critical family leave benefits, but to do so in a prudent and fiscally
responsible way. Since her arrival in Washington, Ivanka Trump has worked on PFL, meeting
with Republican policymakers to convince them that PFL is not just another entitlement
program but an investment in America’s families and future (Trump, 2016). These efforts
have largely been successful in recruiting Republican support, and have culminated in a
Republican-led solution proposed by Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL), Mike Lee (R-UT), and
Joni Ernst (R-IA). This legislation would allow workers to dip into social security funds to
take partially paid parental leave. To repay the funds “borrowed”, the worker would delay
retirement by a few months.
Interest in a national paid family leave program has gained traction on Capitol Hill, and
on July 11, 2018, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on the urgent need for a
bipartisan solution. During this hearing, two pending paid-leave proposals were debated:
the Economic Security for New Parents Act championed by Senator Rubio and the Family
and Medical Insurance Leave (FAMILY) Act championed by Senator Gillibrand (D-NY).
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The FAMILY Act proposes offering up to 12 weeks of PFL for the birth of a child, adoption,
or caring for an ill family member. The program would be funded by employee payroll
taxes and matched employer contributions, and would offer a replacement rate of about 67
percent. This proposal is more generous but more costly than the Republican proposal which
proposes that PFL be extended to care for a new baby but not more generally to care for ill
family members, and be financed by delaying retirement.
However, in spite of the fact that Rubio’s plan is less extensive, his proposal seems to be
the more promising of the two; by giving individuals the option to pay for PFL benefits by
“borrowing” from their own social security contributions, Rubio’s plan does a better job at
aligning incentives. In other words, instead of subjecting everyone to an additional payroll
tax and creating a program that would inefficiently distribute leave benefits, the program
as proposed would zero in on those who really do want or need leave and provide them a
way to take it. The program would be structured in a way that there is a tradeoff between
PFL in the present and retiring earlier in the future, so that subject to the individual’s own
circumstances, utility function, and expectations about the future, he or she can choose how
much leave he or she really needs or wants to take. This is important because as Rossin-
Slater (2017) points out, there is a concern that while PFL may be helpful in helping women
stay in the workforce instead of quitting, for those who would not have quit regardless of
whether they have access to PFL or not, there may be negative impacts on later employment
and earnings if PFL allows them to stay out of the labor force long enough to impact skills
accumulation and experience. In other words, PFL may not necessarily be beneficial for
career-driven women, and a PFL mandate that unconditionally encourages all women to
claim PFL may not be a desirable approach.
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1.6 Conclusion
In light of the recently concentrated efforts towards passing a national PFL program, further
research on the possible effects of PFL in the U.S. is highly pertinent and instructive. While
the evidence collected thus far indicates that PFL can have positive effects on women’s labor
force participation, health outcomes, and may mitigate inequalities in access to leave and
leave-taking, the research on the effects of PFL programs in the U.S. is still limited. The
international landscape does provide some intution but because programs outside of the U.S.
tend to offer considerably longer leave periods, it is not clear that the results of research on
foreign programs can easily be applied to the U.S. case. Furthermore, cultural differences
in work and family may lead to differences in how PFL impacts women, children, families,
and employers in the U.S and abroad. Future research on PFL in the U.S. should attempt
to bridge this gap by investigating other possible effects of PFL. For example, a study of
the possible effects of PFL on labor supply at the participation margin may shed light on
the struggle that women face in juggling work and family and may provide insights on the
types of policies that may be effective in alleviating this struggle. Also, an investigation of
the effects of PFL on schooling may be an interesting direction for new research that may
show that PFL programs may be both directly beneficial to women in the workforce but
may also encourage young women to pursue schooling in the hope of being able to succeed
in navigating the difficulties of being working mothers.
Chapter 2
The Effects of Paid Family Leave on
Leave Usage and Employment: a Case
Study of California, New Jersey, and
Rhode Island
2.1 Introduction
This chapter replicates and extends the results of Rossin-Slater et al. (2013). The purpose
of this exercise is twofold. First, validating the results of a study that is the foundation of
the literature on paid family leave (PFL) in the U.S. is worthwhile in its own right. Second,
extending the work of Rossin-Slater et al. by including later years of data allows me to
examine the robustness of the results over time. Furthermore, by extending the analysis to
other states that have implemented PFL programs (namely New Jersey and Rhode Island),
I present evidence that bolsters my claim that California’s paid family leave program (CA-
PFL) generates stronger effects than New Jersey’s program (NJ-PFL) or Rhode Island’s
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(RI-PFL), supporting the decision to focus my empirical investigation in Chapter 3 on CA-
PFL alone.
The Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) study contributes to the literature on the economic con-
sequences of PFL and is the first study to use CA-PFL as a natural experiment. This study
focuses on paid maternity leave and investigates whether CA-PFL resulted in positive out-
comes for mothers. Specifically, the authors examine four points: First, they establish that
the program was effective in increasing leave usage of mothers. This question is important
because in the absence of paid leave, employees eligible for 12 weeks of unpaid maternity
leave under the FMLA are often unable to take the full 12 weeks (or any time off at all)
because they cannot afford to forego three months of pay. Finding that paid benefits in-
creases the use of maternity leave is evidence that the program increases the accessibility of
maternity leave and helps mothers take the time off needed to recover from childbirth.
The second point the authors address is whether California’s program succeeded in in-
creasing the weekly hours worked by mothers with children. This question is important
because it tests the validity of a popular argument in favor of PFL. In other words, propo-
nents of PFL argue that providing new mothers with job-protected PFL could increase the
mothers’ labor force participation by allowing mothers who would otherwise have quit to
stay employed, and by increasing the labor force attachment of mothers who garner higher
stocks on human capital and are happier at work because of the accommodations offered
to them. The authors find that the program did indeed slightly increase the labor force
participation of mothers (measured by work hours reported in reference week), suggesting
that paid leave can be instrumental in helping women stay in the workforce and possibly in
improving relationships between employers and working mothers.
The third point that the authors investigate is the effect of paid leave on mothers’ wages.
Opponents of paid maternity leave argue that paid leave will impose costs on employers that
will be passed along to female employees either through reduced wages or fewer hires. The
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literature investigating this claim provides mixed evidence; longer leaves are associated with
lower wages (Schonberg, 2014 and Ruhm, 1998) but the same may not apply for shorter
leaves. Therefore, for a leave period lasting at most six weeks, it is uncertain whether
women’s wages will be negatively affected. Rossin-Slater et al. show that wages are not
significantly affected, which suggests that six weeks is not long enough for the potentially
negative effects of PFL on wages to outweigh the gains (which may occur through, say,
improved mother’s health increasing productivity and wages or through the additional human
capital the mother acquires by staying on the job rather than quitting). Nevertheless, it
should still be noted that this result does not preclude other types of negative consequences
for women’s employment. For example, a more recent study by Das and Polacheck (2015)
uses the paid family leave program in California as a natural experiment to show that
unemployment rose for California mothers relative to those in the rest of the U.S. Thus, it
may be the case that Rossin-Slater et al.’s conclusion that women’s wages did not take a hit
does not address other possible avenues by which women’s employment (and therefore wages)
may have been negatively affected. In particular, if some women become unemployed as a
result of paid leave in California, then they are not classified as “at work” in the CPS and are
excluded from the treated sample in the main analysis of the Rossin-Slater et al.study. Thus,
by investigating the change in wages for women in the treated sample, it is possible that
either no changes are detected or slightly positive changes are found if the “better” workers
with higher salaries stay employed or gain additional human capital by staying longer on the
job. In other words, Rossin-Slater et al.’s results may suffer from a selection bias. Although
their results suggest that wages were not significantly impacted, it should be noted that
the authors do not have the statistical power to provide definitive evidence on the sign or
significance of paid leave in their wage equation, nor does their analysis offer any insight on
the precise mechanism affecting wages.
The authors’ fourth point investigates differential treatment effects by subgroups. One
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of the central concerns with CA-PFL is that its accessibility may still be limited for two
reasons. The first reason is that although eligibility for CA-PFL is nearly universal for
working mothers, the PFL law does not offer job-protection for women taking this leave.
Instead, women must use job-protected (but unpaid) time off offered under the FMLA in
conjunction with CA-PFL to receive paid job-protected time off. Because eligibility for
FMLA is more stringent, this may prevent some women eligible for CA-PFL from using
the program. This is especially problematic because FMLA eligibility, and therefore job-
protected leave, is highly correlated with the quality of the job, the wage offered and the
characteristics of the employee. As a result, less educated women, poorer women, and
minority women may be less likely to be covered than other women. The second reason
is that awareness of CA-PFL remains limited even 10 years after implementation. In a
series of surveys, Milkman and Appelbaum (2004 and 2011) assess public awareness of the
program and find that in the 2009-2010 survey, only 56.1 percent of women were aware of
the program’s existence. Furthermore, they find that awareness varies tremendously across
subgroups and that Hispanic, foreign, less educated and low-wage women have significantly
lower awareness levels than other women do. Since these categories of women are the ones
who stand to gain the most from a PFL policy, this finding is alarming. Rossin-Slater et
al. seeks to shed light on these concerns by investigating how California’s program affected
leave usage for various subgroups of women where they stratify their sample by education,
race, and marital status. They find that the policy had a significantly positive effect on
leave-taking for less educated mothers relative to college-educated mothers, for unmarried
mothers relative to married mothers, and for Hispanic mothers relative to white mothers.
I focus the replication on the first point which shows that CA-PFL increased leave-taking
for employed mothers.
CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECTS OF PFL ON LEAVE USAGE AND EMPLOYMENT 31
2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
Rossin-Slater et al. use data from the March CPS Annual Social and Economic (ASEC)
Supplement for the years 1999 to 2010. The large number of observations and the micro-
level data on employment and reasons for leave-taking, render this dataset useful for an
analysis of the effect of CA-PFL on leave taking and labor force participation. I provide
a detailed description of the authors’ data and identification strategy within the context
of the first point their article investigates, namely the impact of California’s paid family
leave program on women’s leave taking. The authors’ estimation results are presented and
replicated in the next section.
Individuals reporting having a job but being absent from work in the week before the
survey are asked directly about the use of maternity leave and other forms of leave. This
provides detailed data on why an individual was absent from work, and enables the authors
to compare leave usage before and after the implementation of CA-PFL. The authors’ first
step is to differentiate between four possible types of leave that a female employee may report
having taken in the previous week. The first type of leave is “maternity leave” which only
includes leaves taken by women who explicitly report maternity leave as the reason for which
they were absent from work during the preceding week. Because mothers may take leave that
is not explicitly classified as “maternity leave” to bond with a new baby, the authors also
define a “family leave” category which includes maternity leave but expands this definition
to include leaves taken because of vacation, personal days, and child-care problems. The
third type of leave is “other leave” which includes all leaves except maternity leave (in other
words, this includes the family leave category as well as other reported leaves such as military
duty). The fourth type of leave is “any leave” which includes absences from work for any
reason including maternity leave.1 All subsequent analyses investigate all four types of leave
1The set of possible leave reasons reported includes: vacation/personal days, own illness/injusry/medical
problems, child care problems, other family/personal obligation, maternity/paternity leave, labor dispute,
CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECTS OF PFL ON LEAVE USAGE AND EMPLOYMENT 32
because the authors want to target women with infants who are on leave regardless of the
self-reported reason for which they are at home.
The authors’ next step is to classify observations as either treated units or control units.
The authors initial sample is limited to civilian women aged 15 to 64. Since the goal is
to identify the effect of paid leave on leave-taking for mothers with infants, the treatment
group consists of mothers in California who have children aged less than 1 residing in the
household. California’s paid family leave program is effective from July 2004 and the data
used is collected in March, so the first cohort of women exposed to treatment is the 2005
cohort, thus dividing the treatment group into pre-policy cohorts for 1999 to 2004 and post-
policy cohorts for 2005 to 2010. Descriptive statistics for the treatment group are presented
and replicated in Table 2.1.2
Ideally one would want to have a control group that differs from the treatment group in
treatment status only but because this is impossible to accomplish, and difficult to approach,
the authors provide an assortment of four control groups, using each in turn to obtain the
relative effect of the policy change on the treatment group, and arguing that, taken together,
useful information can be obtained.
The first control group consists of mothers in California with children aged 5 to 17. The
authors argue that this is the most reliable control group because California mothers with
older children are more likely to have labor market behaviors that are similar to those of
mothers in the treatment group, than are other types on women in California and in the
rest of the U.S. This may be true, and assuming that in the absence of treatment California
weather affected job, school/training, civic/military duty, other. Thus, maternity leave includes only ma-
ternity/paternity leave; family leave includes maternity/paternity leave, vacation/personal days, child care
problems, other family/personal obligation, own illness/injury/medical problems; other leave includes all
leaves except for maternity/paternity; any leave includes all possible leaves.
2These summary statistics are for the sample of treated women that report working any usual hours in the
past calendar year. By conditioning on employment in the past year, the authors intend to estimate the
effect of CA-PFL on the subset of women who were actually potentially eligible to take PFL. The authors
compare these estimates to those they get using a sample that does not condition on past employment.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Treatment Group
Treatment: CA mothers of youngest children aged < 1a
Pre Post
Original Replicated Original Replicated
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Worked any usual hours last
year
0.596 0.015 0.596 0.016 0.583 0.013 0.582 0.014
Conditioning on women who worked any usual hours last year
On maternity leave last week 0.054 0.009 0.054 0.010 0.118 0.012 0.118 0.013
On family leave last week 0.082 0.011 0.082 0.012 0.150 0.013 0.151 0.014
On other leave last week 0.053 0.009 0.053 0.010 0.043 0.007 0.043 0.008
On any leave last week 0.107 0.012 0.107 0.013 0.161 0.013 0.162 0.015
With job and at work last
week
0.598 0.019 0.598 0.021 0.584 0.018 0.583 0.019
Not employed last week 0.304 0.018 0.304 0.020 0.258 0.016 0.257 0.017
Age of youngest child 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mother’s age: <20 0.033 0.007 0.033 0.008 0.025 0.006 0.025 0.006
Mother’s age: 20-29 0.443 0.020 0.443 0.022 0.419 0.018 0.419 0.019
Mother’s age: 30-39 0.446 0.020 0.446 0.021 0.506 0.018 0.505 0.019
Mother’s age: 40-49 0.077 0.011 0.077 0.011 0.049 0.008 0.050 0.007
Mother’s age: 50-59 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Mother is non-Hisp white 0.446 0.020 0.446 0.022 0.420 0.018 0.415 0.020
Mother is black 0.058 0.009 0.058 0.010 0.063 0.009 0.063 0.010
Mother is Hispanic 0.342 0.019 0.342 0.019 0.371 0.017 0.375 0.018
Mother is other race 0.168 0.015 0.168 0.018 0.175 0.014 0.179 0.015
Mother is married 0.803 0.016 0.803 0.017 0.807 0.014 0.807 0.015
Mother is separated 0.027 0.006 0.027 0.007 0.021 0.005 0.021 0.005
Mother is divorced 0.022 0.006 0.022 0.006 0.017 0.005 0.017 0.005
Mother is widowed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Mother is born in US 0.683 0.018 0.682 0.020 0.690 0.017 0.687 0.018
Mother’s ed: < HS 0.141 0.014 0.141 0.014 0.129 0.012 0.130 0.013
Mother’s ed: HS degree 0.243 0.017 0.243 0.019 0.165 0.013 0.164 0.014
Mother’s ed: Some college 0.308 0.018 0.308 0.020 0.302 0.017 0.303 0.018
Mother’s ed: College or > 0.308 0.018 0.308 0.020 0.404 0.018 0.403 0.019
Sample size 649 649 769 769
aData are for 15 to 64 year-old civilians from 1999 to 2010 March Current Population Surveys. All statistics are weighted by
the March CPS Supplement person weights. The pre-treatment period refers to data before 2005. Maternity leave indicates
mothers who report being employed and absent from the job last week due to being on maternity leave. Family leave indicates
mothers who report being employed and absent from work due to vacation or personal days, childcare problems, other family
and personal obligations, maternity and paternity leave, or other reasons. Other leave indicates all reasons for job absences
included in family leave except for maternity leave (i.e. family minus maternity). Any leave indicates mothers employed but
absent from the job last week for any reason. Sample sizes (conditioning on employment in past year) are reported.
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mothers with infants and those with older children would have had similar employment
trends, then this treatment group may be acceptable. The authors do not address this point
but if mothers with infants are consistently younger than those with older children, this
control group may not be ideal because there may be “cohort differences” that translate into
different labor market behaviors and employment trends. Descriptive statistics for this first
control group are presented and replicated in Table 2.2, from which it is clear that the age
distribution is rather different from that for treatment group.
The second control group is composed of California mothers with no children; it is con-
ceptually much less convincing that this group of women has employment trends similar to
those of mothers with infants because women self-select into motherhood and those who
choose not to have children probably differ from those who do on other life choices and
behaviors. Descriptive statistics for this control group are presented in Table 2.3.3
The third control group includes mothers with infants aged less than 1 residing in Florida,
New York, or Texas. Since these are the next three largest states, the authors may have
been trying to build a control group from states that are “similar” to California because
of size or that have enough diversity to match California’s. Results from the specifications
that use this group are smaller in magnitude and measured less precisely than those from
specifications using the first two control groups. However, it should be noted that since
New York has a temporary disability insurance (TDI) program similar to the state disability
insurance (SDI) program in California, which is the foundation of the paid leave program,
including New York in the “donor pool” of controls is not ideal. The authors must have
realized this because they mention it in the working paper version of this article, but they
disregard this point in the final published version of the paper. Descriptive statistics for this
control group are presented in Table 2.4.
3Note that Rossin-Slater et al. do not present descriptive statistics for control groups 2, 3, and 4. Thus there
is only one set of statistics; the ones I present.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Comparison Group 1
Comparison 1: CA mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17a
Pre Post
Original Replicated Original Replicated
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Worked any usual hours last
year
0.750 0.005 0.750 0.005 0.724 0.004 0.724 0.005
Conditioning on women who worked any usual hours last year
On maternity leave last week 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
On family leave last week 0.015 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.017 0.002 0.017 0.002
On other leave last week 0.032 0.002 0.032 0.002 0.031 0.002 0.031 0.002
On any leave last week 0.034 0.002 0.034 0.003 0.032 0.002 0.032 0.002
With job and at work last week 0.865 0.004 0.865 0.005 0.883 0.004 0.883 0.004
Not employed last week 0.111 0.004 0.111 0.004 0.093 0.003 0.093 0.004
Age of youngest child 10.544 0.047 10.544 0.051 10.918 0.044 10.920 0.046
Mother’s age: <20 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mother’s age: 20-29 0.062 0.003 0.062 0.003 0.054 0.003 0.054 0.003
Mother’s age: 30-39 0.364 0.006 0.364 0.007 0.310 0.005 0.310 0.006
Mother’s age: 40-49 0.478 0.006 0.478 0.007 0.493 0.006 0.493 0.006
Mother’s age: 50-59 0.092 0.004 0.092 0.004 0.138 0.004 0.138 0.004
Mother is non-Hisp white 0.456 0.006 0.456 0.007 0.402 0.006 0.399 0.006
Mother is black 0.075 0.003 0.075 0.004 0.075 0.003 0.075 0.003
Mother is Hispanic 0.326 0.006 0.326 0.006 0.378 0.006 0.380 0.006
Mother is other race 0.156 0.005 0.156 0.005 0.170 0.004 0.173 0.005
Mother is married 0.714 0.006 0.714 0.006 0.716 0.005 0.715 0.005
Mother is separated 0.051 0.003 0.051 0.003 0.054 0.003 0.054 0.003
Mother is divorced 0.136 0.004 0.136 0.005 0.122 0.004 0.122 0.004
Mother is widowed 0.018 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.001
Mother is born in US 0.625 0.006 0.623 0.007 0.579 0.006 0.577 0.006
Mother’s ed: < HS 0.173 0.005 0.173 0.005 0.175 0.004 0.175 0.004
Mother’s ed: HS degree 0.243 0.005 0.243 0.006 0.214 0.005 0.214 0.005
Mother’s ed: Some college 0.328 0.006 0.328 0.007 0.304 0.005 0.303 0.006
Mother’s ed: College or > 0.255 0.006 0.255 0.006 0.307 0.005 0.307 0.006
Sample size 6,092 6,092 7,437 7,437
aSee notes from Table 2.1.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics: Comparison Group 2
Comparison 2: Women with No Childrena
Pre Post
Mean SE Mean SE
Worked any usual hours
last year
0.672 0.004 0.642 0.004
Conditioning on women who worked any usual hours last year
On maternity leave last
week
0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000
On family leave last week 0.019 0.002 0.020 0.001
On other leave last week 0.030 0.002 0.031 0.002
On any leave last week 0.031 0.002 0.033 0.002
With job and at work last
week
0.843 0.004 0.846 0.004
Not employed last week 0.129 0.004 0.126 0.003
Age of youngest child N/A
Age: <20 0.098 0.003 0.080 0.002
Age: 20-29 0.307 0.005 0.319 0.005
Age: 30-39 0.173 0.004 0.165 0.004
Age: 40-49 0.169 0.004 0.151 0.004
Age: 50-59 0.195 0.005 0.211 0.004
Mother is non-Hisp white 0.600 0.005 0.541 0.005
Mother is black 0.063 0.003 0.063 0.002
Mother is Hispanic 0.204 0.004 0.245 0.004
Mother is other race 0.144 0.004 0.169 0.004
Mother is married 0.323 0.005 0.327 0.005
Mother is separated 0.022 0.002 0.020 0.001
Mother is divorced 0.135 0.004 0.123 0.003
Mother is widowed 0.023 0.002 0.019 0.001
Mother is born in US 0.771 0.004 0.757 0.004
Mother’s ed: < HS 0.112 0.003 0.099 0.003
Mother’s ed: HS degree 0.201 0.004 0.179 0.004
Mother’s ed: Some college 0.372 0.005 0.357 0.005
Mother’s ed: College or > 0.315 0.005 0.364 0.005
Sample size 9,503 11,590
aSee notes from Table 2.1.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics: Comparison Group 3
Comparison 3: Mothers of Youngest Children
aged < 1 in FL, NY, TXa
Pre Post
Mean SE Mean SE
Worked any usual hours
last year
0.607 0.012 0.610 0.012
Conditioning on women who worked any usual hours last year
On maternity leave last week 0.085 0.010 0.094 0.009
On family leave last week 0.102 0.010 0.117 0.010
On other leave last week 0.027 0.005 0.030 0.005
On any leave last week 0.111 0.011 0.124 0.010
With job and at work last
week
0.626 0.015 0.635 0.015
Not employed last week 0.267 0.014 0.244 0.013
Age of youngest child 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mother’s age: <20 0.048 0.007 0.041 0.006
Mother’s age: 20-29 0.480 0.016 0.465 0.015
Mother’s age: 30-39 0.421 0.015 0.451 0.015
Mother’s age: 40-49 0.047 0.008 0.040 0.006
Mother’s age: 50-59 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001
Mother is non-Hisp white 0.573 0.015 0.555 0.015
Mother is black 0.154 0.012 0.143 0.011
Mother is Hispanic 0.253 0.013 0.270 0.013
Mother is other race 0.034 0.006 0.058 0.007
Mother is married 0.761 0.013 0.739 0.014
Mother is separated 0.030 0.005 0.016 0.004
Mother is divorced 0.031 0.005 0.030 0.005
Mother is widowed 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
Mother is born in US 0.826 0.011 0.817 0.011
Mother’s ed: < HS 0.130 0.011 0.100 0.009
Mother’s ed: HS degree 0.267 0.014 0.245 0.013
Mother’s ed: Some college 0.281 0.014 0.272 0.014
Mother’s ed: College or > 0.323 0.015 0.383 0.015
Sample size 1,202 1,197
aSee notes from Table 2.1.
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The fourth control group includes mothers with infants aged less than 1 residing in all
other states except California and excluded states that implemented PFL programs later on
(New Jersey, Rhode Island, New York, Washington, Washington D.C.). Descriptive statistics
for this control group are presented in Table 2.5.
Results from specifications that use the treatment and control groups as described above
do not condition on employment status and therefore paid leave eligibility (in other words,
in these specifications, the authors make no attempt to estimate the effect of CA-PFL on the
subsample of women who would have been eligible for the the program). The authors provide
additional estimates that result from specifications in which the treatment and control groups
are further narrowed down to only women who report positive number of hours worked in
the previous year. In other words, these estimates are calculated on the sample of women
who are probably eligible for paid leave. To the extent that the authors are able to correctly
identify which women were working in the previous year and would be currently eligible for
PFL, these conditional estimates should capture the effect of CA-PFL on leave-taking for
women who have access to CA-PFL, and these estimates are therefore more interesting and
relevant those on the complete sample.
The authors’ model is based on a difference-in-difference (DID) technique in which leave
usage for California mothers with infants (the treatment group) before and after the im-
plementation of CA-PFL is compared to leave usage for comparison groups unlikely to be
affected by CA-PFL. The general model is given by equation (2.1):
Ysit = β0 + β1 × TREATsi + β2 × POSTt + β3 × POSTt × TREATsi
+γ
′
Xsit + δt + θs + λ× UEst + εsit
(2.1)
For individual i surveyed in year t and state s, Ysit is the outcome (i.e., use of either
maternity, family, other, or any leave). TREATi is an indicator equal to 1 for California
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics: Comparison Group 4
Comparison 4: Mothers of Youngest Children
aged < 1, all states except excluded statesa
Pre Post
Mean SE Mean SE
Worked any usual hours
last year
0.678 0.005 0.673 0.005
Conditioning on women who worked any usual hours last year
On maternity leave last week 0.072 0.004 0.100 0.004
On family leave last week 0.093 0.004 0.120 0.004
On other leave last week 0.030 0.002 0.033 0.002
On any leave last week 0.103 0.004 0.133 0.004
With job and at work last
week
0.633 0.006 0.631 0.006
Not employed last week 0.268 0.006 0.241 0.005
Age of youngest child 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mother’s age: <20 0.049 0.003 0.031 0.002
Mother’s age: 20-29 0.496 0.007 0.511 0.006
Mother’s age: 30-39 0.411 0.006 0.422 0.006
Mother’s age: 40-49 0.041 0.003 0.034 0.002
Mother’s age: 50-59 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Mother is non-Hisp white 0.711 0.006 0.714 0.006
Mother is black 0.145 0.005 0.124 0.004
Mother is Hispanic 0.106 0.004 0.114 0.004
Mother is other race 0.046 0.003 0.060 0.003
Mother is married 0.769 0.006 0.761 0.005
Mother is separated 0.021 0.002 0.020 0.002
Mother is divorced 0.029 0.002 0.029 0.002
Mother is widowed 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
Mother is born in US 0.894 0.004 0.882 0.004
Mother’s ed: < HS 0.106 0.004 0.076 0.003
Mother’s ed: HS degree 0.278 0.006 0.235 0.005
Mother’s ed: Some college 0.295 0.006 0.293 0.006
Mother’s ed: College or > 0.322 0.006 0.396 0.006
Sample size 8,497 9,255
aSee notes from Table 2.1.
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mothers with infants less than a year old at the time of the survey, and equal to 0 otherwise.
POSTt is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is surveyed in the year 2005 or after, and
is equal to 0 otherwise. Xsit is a vector of individual characteristics including age (<20, 20-
29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59), marital status (married, separated, divorced, widowed), education
(<high school, high school, some college, college graduate), and whether or not the individual
is born in the United States. Regression specifications using control group 1 also control for
age of the youngest child,4 and specifications using control groups 3 and 4 control for state
fixed effects, θs, as well as state-year unemployment, UEst. δt is a vector of time fixed effects
and εsit is the regression disturbance. The coefficient of interest is β3 which estimates the
treatment effect of CA-PFL on treated women’s leave-taking behavior.
The key identification assumption for this model to yield causal estimates of the effects of
CA-PFL is that in the absence of CA-PFL, outcomes for treated and untreated groups would
have followed parallel trends; in other words, the model assumes that changes in outcomes
(although not necessarily levels of outcomes) would have been the same for both treated
and untreated groups in the absence of CA-PFL. Thus, differences from the trend can be
attributed to CA-PFL.
It should also be noted that a logit or probit model would be a logical choice to estimate
equation (2.1), where the dependent variable is binary. The authors note that they do
estimate these alternative models and find similar resilts, suggesting that any bias from using
a linear probability model is likely to be small. Although theoretically less appropriate for a
regression with a binary dependent variable, the linear probability model has the advantage
of being easier to interpret (marginal effects in logit and probit models are more difficult
to calculate). In Section 2.5 I verify the robustness of Rossin-Slater et al.’s results to using
probit and logit models.
4Also, specifications using control group 1 only contain observations in California so for these specifications,
the s subscript is not relevant and the state fixed effects component and state-year unemployment are left
out.
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Due to the concern that disturbance terms in a DID model may exhibit correlation
induced by common group effects (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004), Rossin-Slater
et al. use a two-step procedure proposed by Donald and Lang (2007) to account for this
correlation. Donald and Lang argue that Moulton’s critique5 of estimation with grouped
data applies to DID estimation. They provide evidence6 that taking into account a possible
group-error component may dramatically reduce the precision of estimates, and that their
two-step method performs better than other methods of addressing the correlation problem
(e.g., clustering) when the number of groups is small and the number of observations in each
group is large (as is the case in the current work).
The Donald and Lang procedure carried out by Rossin-Slater et al. is done as follows.
In the first step, regression-adjusted differences in leave outcomes (maternity, family, other,




Xsit + πt × TREATsi + δt + θs + λ× UEst + εsit (2.2)
Ysit is the leave outcomes as defined previously. All regressions control for the vector of
individual characteristics, Xsit and time fixed effects, δt. Regressions using control group 1
also control for age of youngest child (and leave out state fixed effects and state-year unem-
ployment), and regressions using control groups 3 and 4 also control for state fixed effects
amd state-year unemployment rates. The vector πt contains regression-adjusted differences
between treated and untreated groups for each survey year. The constant is omitted from
5Moulton (1990) points out that not accounting for correlation of errors within groups can result in spurious
regressions when estimating the effects of aggregate variables on micro-units. Standard errors will be severely
downward biased which can dramatically affect the interpretation of the significance of estimated effects and
lead to erroneous conclusions.
6The authors apply their approach to two influential papers: Gruber and Poterba’s (1994) study on health
insurance and self-employment and Card’s (1990) study on the Mariel boatlift. They show that properly
taking into account the group-error component results in much greater standard errors.
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this first regression so that all year dummies can be included.
In the second step, we analyze the variation in π̂t, the estimated regression-adjusted
differences between the treatment and control group by year. In other words, π̂t is regressed
on the POSTt indicator, which is equal to 1 for years 2005 onwards, as given by equation
(2.3):
π̂t = ρ0 + ρ1 × POSTt + ut (2.3)
The coefficient ρ1 estimates the effect of CA-PFL on leave taking. Regressions of equa-
tion (2.3) are weighted by the sum of individual CPS weights for each year. If paid leave
can explain differences in leave outcomes for treated and untreated observations, then the
coefficient ρ1 will be statistically significant. Inference is performed using the t-distribution
with 10 degrees of freedom, as shown by Donald and Lang.
2.3 Replication
The authors’ main findings are presented in Table 3 of their paper. I replicate the full table
and present my results alongside the original ones. As an initial check, I confirm that my
sample size for the treatment group is the same as the authors’ (N = 2,482). I also confirm
the sample sizes for the four control groups (N = 18,593, N = 33,790, N = 4,000, N =
26,123).7 To confirm that variables used in the replication are accurately defined, Table 1
of Rossin-Slater et al., which contains summary statistics, is replicated first; those for the
treatment group are presented in Table 2.1 in this essay, and those for the first control group
are presented in Table 2.2. Although Rossin-Slater et al. do not present summary statistics
7Note that the authors give a sample size of N = 28,605 for the fourth control group, which should include
mothers with infants in all states other than California. However this is a typo and probably results from
accidentally including mothers with infants in California (who form the treatment group).
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for control groups 2, 3, and 4, I present these as well in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
The original results in Table 3 of Rossin-Slater et al. are replicated and presented in Table
2.6. Each of the four panels in Table 2.6 makes use of a different control group, and includes
four columns for the different results using the four different leave definitions. Furthermore,
the authors present the results from the full sample and results they call the “implied TOT
from the ITT” estimates which are calculated as the estimates from the full sample, divided
by the proportion of women in the total sample that worked any usual hours in the previous
week (0.596) and would therefore probably be “eligible for treatment”.
For example, the first panel of Table 2.6 shows the coefficient on ρ1 when the Donald and
Lang procedure is executed using the treated and first control group sample that conditions
on having worked any positive number of hours, and each of the four leave outcomes. When
leave taking is defined as maternity leave only, the authors find that paid leave increases leave
usage by 6.32 percentage points, which is significant at the 1 percent level. Because the pre-
treatment average leave taking for the treatment group is 5.4 percent, this implies about a
117 percent increase in maternity leave usage. The “implied TOT from the ITT” estimate
of 0.0598 is the result of ρ1 evaluated on the sample that does not condition on employment
(0.0357) divided by the proportion of women who work (0.596). I replicate Rossin-Slater et
al.’s estimates on the full sample, on the sample that conditions on employment, and what
they call the the “implied TOT estimates” and obtain results that are very close both in
magnitude and significance.
When the leave definition is expanded to include other reported types of family leave,
the estimated results are similar in magnitude and significance, indicating that paid leave
increases leave usage by 6.45 percentage points. However, the pre-treatment average family-
leave usage is 8.2 percent, implying that paid leave increased leave usage by a bit under 80


















































Table 2.6: Effects of CA-PFL on Leave Taking, 1999-2010
Maternity
leavea
Family leave Other leave Any leave
Original Replicated Original Replicated Original Replicated Original Replicated
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0632*** 0.0639*** 0.0645*** 0.0653*** -0.0085 -0.0089 0.0548** 0.0550**
(0.0126) (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0151) (0.0148)
“Implied TOT from ITT estimate”b [0.0598] 0.0607 [0.0609] 0.0619 [-0.0080] -0.0085 [0.0518] 0.0522
N = 14,947
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0623*** 0.0628*** 0.0676*** 0.0680*** -0.0086 -0.0090 0.0537** 0.0538**
(0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0170) (0.0168)
“Implied TOT from ITT estimate” [0.0592] 0.0595 [0.0647] 0.0648 [-0.0088] -0.0094 [0.0501] 0.0501
N = 22, 511
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, NY, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0531** 0.0695** 0.0529** 0.0658* -0.0130 -0.0211 0.0401 0.0484*
(0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0190) (0.0193) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0248) (0.0246)
“Implied TOT from ITT estimate” [0.0494] 0.0684 [0.0489] 0.0645 [-0.0132] -0.0213 [0.0362] 0.0470
N = 3,817
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except CA
‘Estimated PFL effect 0.0342** 0.0352** 0.0401** 0.0408** -0.0119 -0.0126 0.0222 0.0226
(0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0177) (0.0182)
“Implied TOT from ITT estimate” [0.0285] 0.0294 [0.0359] 0.0365 [-0.0104] -0.0115 [0.0181] 0.0178
N = 17,533
aSee note from Table 2.1. Each coefficient is from a separate regression, with standard errors below in parentheses. The data are from the 1999 to 2010 March CPS
surveys. The sample is limited to women in the adult civilian population aged 15 to 64 years. The authors further limit the sample to women who report working
any usual number of hours in the last year. The sample size for the sample that conditions on employment is 14,947, and the full sample size is 21,075. The implied
TOT coefficient is calculated by dividing the ITT effect by the average pre-PFL treatment group employment rate as measured by any usual hours worked (0.596).
The treatment group consists of women in CA with a youngest child aged < 1 year in the household. Comparison group 1 consists of women in CA with children
aged 5 to 17, comparison group 2 consists of women in CA with no children, comparison group 3 consists of women with youngest child < 1 year in FL, NY, and TX,
and comparison group 4 consists of women with youngest child < 1 year in all states except CA. All regressions control for age categories (<20, 20 to 29, 30 to 39, 40
to 49, 50 to 59, and 60+), indicators for race and ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, black, Hispanic, other), indicators for marital status (married, divorced, separated,
widowed, never married), an indicator for being born in the U.S., indicators for education categories (< HS, HS, some college, college or more), and time fixed effects.
Specifications using the second comparison group include indicators for single years of youngest child’s age. Specifications using multiple states include state fixed
effects and state-year unemployment rates (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics). The estimated treatment effects are calculated using the Donald and Lang (2007)
two-step method. In the first step, each outcome is regressed on the full set of controls, survey year dummies, and the year dummies interacted with treatment status,
with no constant. The regression is weighted by March CPS Supplement person weights. In the second step, the data are collapsed into 12 survey-year cells, and the
coefficient on the interaction between treatment status and the year is regressed on an indicator for post-2004 in a regression that is weighted by the sum of the March
CPS Supplement person weights in each year. The coefficient and corresponding standard error on the post-2004 indicator is reported here. Statistical significance is
determined using the Student’s t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom (n−2). Significance levels: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.
bCalculated as the estimated effect from the full sample divided by the proportion of women who work and usual hours (0.596).
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Because “other leave” includes all leave categories excluding maternity leave, one can
think of this category as the set of family leave minus the set of maternity leave. The
small and statistically insignificant estimated coefficient from this regression suggests that
maternity leave drives the large and statistically significant estimated coefficient for the
“family leave” regression. Also, this further supports the possibility that the results found
for maternity and family leave are not spurious but rather driven by policy change. An
interesting point to note is that across the board, estimates of the effect of CA-PFL on
“other leave” are negative but statistically insignificant. This was also the case in Rossin-
Slater et al.’s analysis. A possible explanation for the consistently negative sign may be
that in the absence of paid leave, women are taking leave in “other” forms to recover from
childbirth and bond with a new baby. The widespread availability of PFL probably leads to
shifting away from “other” forms of leave to taking explicit “maternity” leave as mothers go
on PFL instead. Once again, replicated results are close.
When “any leave” is used as the dependent variable, the effect is slightly smaller than
those found for maternity and family leave, and is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. The slightly dampened effects and lower signficance level are probably due to the noise
brought into the regression by all the other types of leaves other than maternity leave. The
previous three regressions indicate that maternity leave drives the leave-taking results and
so by adding all other leaves to the regression there may be a loss of precision. Replicated
results are very close.
The second panel of Table 2.6 repeats the analysis using the second control group and
replicated results are close to those of the authors’. Estimated effects using the second control
group are very close to those found using the first control group, with an estimated increase
of 6.23 percentage points in maternity leave usage after CA-PFL. This implies an increase
of 115 percent from the average pre-treatment maternity leave usage and is significant at
the 1 percent level. The third panel uses the third control group, and the authors report
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including state fixed effects and state-year unemployment data. Results for this regression
are qualitatively similar to those using the first two control groups, but are somewhat smaller
in magnitude and are estimated with less precision; the estimated effect on maternity leave
usage is 5.31 percentage points (about a 98 percent increase). However, when I carry out
the Donald and Lang procedure, my results differ from those the authors present. Table
2.7 presents alternative specifications that suggest what may have gone wrong. I run three
additional analyses: the first omits state fixed effects and unemployment data, the second
omits unemployment but includes state fixed effects, and the third omits state fixed effects
and includes unemployment. Comparing these three specifications with the one the authors
claim to have run (including both unemployment and state fixed effects), it seems that the
authors probably neglected to control for unemployment in their analysis. Since the authors
do not mention a source for unemployment data, this is plausible.
The fourth panel uses the fourth control group, which includes mothers with infants
residing in all states and controls for state-year unemployment and state fixed effects. One
point to note is that the recorded sample size of 17,533 in the authors’ Table 3 notes is
incorrect: The correct sample size is 19,170, as is correctly recorded in the appendix to the
online version of Rossin-Slater et al. (Table A.1).8 While the signs on estimated coefficients
are consistent with those from the previous three panels, they are much smaller in magnitude.
For example, the estimated effect on maternity leave usage is an increase of 3.42 percentage
points (a 63 percent increase). Replicated results are very close to the original results.


















































Table 2.7: Attempt to Match Comparison Group 3 Results
Maternity
leavea
Family leave Other leave Any leave
Original Replicated Original Replicated Original Replicated Original Replicated
** WITH UNEMP and WITH STATE FE (AS SHOULD BE) **
Estimated PFL effect 0.0531** 0.0695** 0.0529** 0.0658* -0.0130 -0.0211 0.0401 0.0484*
(0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0190) (0.0193) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0248) (0.0246)
“Implied TOT from ITT estimate” [0.0494] 0.0684 [0.0489] 0.0645 [-0.0132] -0.0213 [0.0362] 0.0470
N = 3,817
** WITHOUT UNEMP and WITHOUT STATE FE **
Estimated PFL effect 0.0531** 0.0537** 0.0529** 0.0530** -0.0130 -0.0135 0.0401 0.0402
(0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0248) (0.0244)
“Implied TOT from ITT estimate” [0.0494] 0.0506 [0.0489] 0.0490 [-0.0132] -0.0142 [0.0362] 0.0364
N = 3,817
** WITHOUT UNEMP and WITH STATE FE **
Estimated PFL effect 0.0531** 0.0537** 0.0529** 0.0530** -0.0130 -0.0134 0.0401 0.0403
(0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0248) (0.0243)
“Implied TOT from ITT estimate” [0.0494] 0.0503 [0.0489] 0.0489 [-0.0132] -0.0140 [0.0362] 0.0363
N = 3,817
** WITHOUT STATE FE and WITH UNEMP**
Estimated PFL effect 0.0531** 0.0666** 0.0529** 0.0637** -0.0130 -0.0200 0.0401 0.0467*
(0.0171) (0.0165) (0.0190) (0.0192) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0248) (0.0246)
“Implied TOT from ITT estimate” [0.0494] 0.0660 [0.0489] 0.0631 [-0.0132] -0.0200 [0.0362] 0.0460
N = 3,817
aSee notes from Tables 2.1 and 2.6.
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Overall, in specifications that use the first, second, and fourth control groups, replicated
estimates are very close to those of the authors’. Both the original and replicated results
support the possibility of a positive relationship between access to paid leave and leave-
taking. This result is meaningful because it indicates that CA-PFL was effective in increasing
leave usage. Successfully verifying the results of Rossin-Slater et al. lays the groundwork for
building on their analysis in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
2.4 Extension: Using Later Years of Data
The first extension to the study of Rossin-Slater et al. is to extend the sample with data
from 2011 to 2018. For this analysis, I limit the sample to states that had not passed PFL
programs during the sample period: i.e., I exclude New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington,
New York, and Washington D.C. 9
The analysis focuses only on the sample that conditions on employment, meaning that
all observations in the extended sample report positive usual number of hours worked in the
past year. I perform the same analysis as performed in Table 2.6. I present results for all four
control groups but focus on the first and fourth, following Rossin-Slater et al.’s argument
that the first is the best control group. I also use the fourth control group because I argue
this is the best control group. Replicated results from the 1999-2010 sample and extended
results for the 1999-2018 sample are presented in Table 2.8.
9An alternative more nuanced approach is to include observations for each of these states up until the year
in which the state passes PFL. I repeat the analysis using this approach and find that results are very close


















































Table 2.8: Effects of CA-PFL on Leave Taking, 1999-2018
Effects of CA-PFL on leave-taking with different comparison groups, years 1999-2018
Maternity leavea Family leave Other leave Any leave
Replicated Extended Replicated Extended Replicated Extended Replicated Extended
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0639*** 0.0694*** 0.0653*** 0.0532*** -0.0089 -0.0156* 0.0550** 0.0442**
(0.0121) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0148) (0.0163)
N = 25,306
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0628*** 0.0738*** 0.0680*** 0.0590*** -0.0090 -0.0156 0.0538** 0.0453**
(0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0109) (0.0138) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0168) (0.0198)
N = 37,683
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, NY, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0695** 0.0556** 0.0658* 0.0418** -0.0211 -0.0228* 0.0484* 0.0335
(0.0167) (0.0175) (0.0193) (0.0167) (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0246) (0.0229)
N = 5,083
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0342** 0.0451*** 0.0401** 0.0380*** -0.0119 -0.0195* 0.0222 0.0236
(0.0125) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0099) (0.0115) (0.0099) (0.0177) (0.0160)
N = 27,898
aSee notes from Tables 2.1 and 2.6. Data is extended with additional years of data from 2011 to 2018. “Replicated” refers to estimates from the replication on the
1999-2010 sample. “Extended” refers to the updated estimates on the 1999-2018 sample. Analysis is otherwise identical to that described in Table 2. Sample sizes are
25,306, 37,683, 5,083, and 27,898, using comparison groups 1, 2, 3, and 4. Inference is conducted using Student’s t-distribution with 18 degrees of freedom. *P < 0.10,
**P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.
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Adding additional years of post-treatment data shows that the impact of CA-PFL on
leave-taking has increased even more in recent years. Compared to California mothers with
older children, CA-PFL resulted in a 6.9 percentage point increase in maternity-leave usage.
Pre-treatment maternity-leave usage is 5.31 percent which implies an increase of 129 percent.
This effect is can be visualized in Figure 2.1 which shows a plot of π̂t, regression adjusted
differences in leave usage between treatment and the first control group.10 Figure 2.1 also
shows that there is an upward trend in the magnitude of the differences in leave usage between
treated and control units. However, the plot of π̂t suggests that there was already an upward
trend in maternity leave usage pre-treatment. Figure 2.2 confirms this by showing trend lines
for the pre-treatment period and the post-treatment period. There is a clear upward trend
trend in maternity leave usage even prior to the implementation of CA-PFL in 2005. In fact,
the trend line has a steeper slope pre-treatment compared to post-treatment. While this does
not rule out effects of CA-PFL, it does weaken the argument that CA-PFL is responsible
for the entire increase in leave taking post-2005. Also, it is interesting to note that there
is a slight jump between 2016 and 2017, suggesting that an awareness campaign launched
by California in 2017 (to be discussed in more detail later on) was successful in increasing
awareness of CA-PFL and leave-usage. Results for other types of leave are comparable to the
original results of Rossin-Slater et al. Taken together, this extended analysis demonstrates
the robustness of Rossin-Slater’s results on the impact of CA-PFL in effectively increasing
leave usage, but raises some doubts about the estimates because of the rising leave-taking
trend in California pre-treatment.
10The horizontal lines are calculated by regressing π̂t on the POST indicator for the relevant time period. In
other words, for the pre-treatment period, this includes the years 1999 to 2004 and for the post-treatment
period, this includes the years 2005 to 2018. Regressions are weighted using the relevant CPS weights.
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Figure 2.1: Regression-adjusted Differences in Maternity Leave Usage between Treatment
and Control 1: Visualizing the Effect of CA-PFL
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Figure 2.2: Regression-adjusted Differences in Maternity Leave Usage between Treatment
and Control 1: Pre- and Post-CA-PFL Trends
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2.5 Extension: Verifying Robustness to Choice of Other
Estimation Models
The second extension is to verify the robustness of the results obtained for the 1999-2018
sample to the choice of other estimation models. Rossin-Slater et al. estimate a two-step
model in which they use a linear probability model (LPM) in the first step and Ordinary Least
Sqaures (OLS) in the second step, and this is the approach used in the replicated estimates
and extended estimates for the 1999-2018 sample. A more appropriate choice may have been
to use either a probit or a logit model in the first step because of the binary outcome variable
on the left-hand side of the regression (i.e., on leave or not on leave); a binary dependent
variable results in a data distribution that is better fitted by either a probit or logit curve.
Furthermore, while Rossin-Slater et al. choose to use OLS in the second step, this requires
making restrictive assumptions about the regression error structure which are unlikely to be
true because π̂t for t = 1, . . . , T are estimated slopes and V ar(π̂) for π̂ = (π̂1, . . . , π̂T )
′ is not
a scalar matrix. Thus, using a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model in the second stage
may be a more appropriate choice; for example, see Amemiya (1978). To test the robustness
of Rossin-Slater et al.’s approach to using different (and arguably better) estimation models,
I first repeat the analysis using OLS in the first stage and GLS in the second stage. For
this exercise, I repeat the analysis for all control groups because the basis for this extension
is to test the robustness of Rossin-Slater et al.’s approach to using the theoretically correct
approach that they should have used but did not. In other words, verifying that all results
are close in magnitude and significance is important. I use all available data from 1999 to
2018, thus results are compared to those from the first extension which uses OLS on the
1999-2018 sample. Results are presented in Table 2.9.
Examining the results in Table 2.9, using GLS instead of OLS in the second stage does
not alter the interpretation of the results. Compared to the OLS estimates, 12 of the 16 GLS
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estimates are greater than their OLS counterparts, while 4 are smaller, so it does appear
that GLS results in stronger effects. However, signs on estimated coefficients are the same,
and results are statistically significant across the board. Computing percentage differences
between new and old estimates (calculated as ((ρnew − ρold)/ | ρold |) × 100), the average
percentage difference for the 1999-2018 sample is 16.91 percent. In other words, the GLS
estimates are on average 16.91 percent greater than the OLS estimates.
Thus, it appears that GLS resulted in greater estimates. Nevertheless, interpretations are
not greatly changed; conclusions drawn from the results using the OLS model are consistent
with those drawn using the GLS approach.
I also repeat the analysis using a probit model in the first step and GLS in the second
step. Results are in Table 2.10 and are presented alongside results from using the linear
probability model in the first stage and GLS in the second.11
11I also estimate the model using a logit model in the first step and GLS is the second step; results are very
similar in magnitude and significance to those from using a probit in the first step and GLS in the second,


















































Table 2.9: Effects of CA-PFL on Leave Taking, GLS
Maternity leavea Family leave Other leave Any leave
OLS GLS OLS GLS OLS GLS OLS GLS
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0694*** 0.0730*** 0.0532*** 0.0628*** -0.0156* -0.0125 0.0442** 0.0607***
(0.0107) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0144) (0.0081) (0.0102) (0.0163) (0.0157)
N = 25,306
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0738*** 0.0732*** 0.0590*** 0.0700*** -0.0156 -0.0071 0.0453** 0.0653***
(0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0138) (0.0144) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0198) (0.0156)
N = 37,683
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, NY, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0556** 0.0492** 0.0418** 0.0372* -0.0228* -0.0134 0.0335 0.0320
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0167) (0.0200) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0229) (0.0214)
N = 5,083
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0451*** 0.0468** 0.0380*** 0.0384** -0.0195* -0.0154 0.0236 0.0317*
(0.0107) (0.0129) (0.0099) (0.0150) (0.0099) (0.0102) (0.0160) (0.0162)
N = 27,898
aResults from applying a variation of Rossin-Slater’s two step approach; the first step uses a linear probability model and the second step uses GLS. See note from Table
2.1 Each coefficient is from a separate regression, with standard errors below in parentheses. “OLS” refers to the estimates from using OLS in the second step for the
1999-2018 sample. “GLS” refers to the estimates from applying GLS in the second step for the 1999-2018 sample. The data are from the 1999 to 2018 March CPS
surveys. The sample is limited to women in the adult civilian population aged 15 to 64 years. The sample is further limited to women who report working any usual
number of hours in the last year. The treatment group consists of women in CA with a youngest child aged < 1 year in the household. Comparison group 1 consists of
women in CA with children aged 5 to 17, comparison group 2 consists of women in CA with no children, comparison group 3 consists of women with youngest child <
1 year in FL, NY, and TX, and comparison group 4 consists of women with youngest child < 1 year in all states except CA. All regressions control for age categories
(<20, 20 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 59, and 60+), indicators for race and ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, black, Hispanic, other), indicators for marital status
(married, divorced, separated, widowed, never married), an indicator for being born in the U.S., indicators for education categories (< HS, HS, some college, college or
more), and time fixed effects. Specifications using the second comparison group include indicators for single years of youngest child’s age. Specifications using multiple
states include state fixed effects and state-year unemployment rates (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics). The estimated treatment effects are calculated using the
Donald and Lang (2007) two-step method. In the first step, each outcome is regressed on the full set of controls, survey year dummies, and the year dummies interacted
with treatment status, with no constant. V ar(π̂) is obtained from the first stage and is used to calculate ̂ρGLS in the second stage. ̂ρGLS coefficients and standard


















































Table 2.10: Effects of CA-PFL on Leave Taking, Probit and GLS
Maternity leavea Family leave Other leave Any leave
LPM+GLS Probit+GLS LPM+GLS Probit+GLS LPM+GLS Probit+GLS LPM+GLS Probit+GLS
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0730*** 0.0075 0.0628*** 0.0152 -0.0125 -0.0129* 0.0607*** 0.0229
(0.0119) (0.0191) (0.0144) (0.0151) (0.0102) (0.0065) (0.0157) (0.0149)
Min 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0603 0.0024
Max 0.1749 0.1029 -0.0016 0.1019
N = 25,306
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0732*** 0.0061 0.0700*** 0.0203 -0.0071 -0.0075** 0.0653*** 0.0235
(0.0119) (0.0160) (0.0144) (0.0197) (0.0101) (0.0034) (0.0156) (0.0167)
Min 0.0000 0.0013 -0.0212 0.0021
Max 0.1243 0.1175 -0.0016 0.0900
N = 37,683
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, NY, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0492** 0.0334** 0.0372* 0.0368** -0.0134 -0.0181 0.0320 0.0289**
(0.0175) (0.0144) (0.0200) (0.0147) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0214) (0.0107)
Min 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0697 0.0029
Max 0.0894 0.0803 -0.0002 0.0583
N = 5,083
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0468** 0.0339*** 0.0384** 0.0365*** -0.0154 -0.0196** 0.0317* 0.0215***
(0.0129) (0.0111) (0.0150) (0.0111) (0.0102) (0.0090) (0.0162) (0.0060)
Min 0.0020 0.0019 -0.0862 0.0035
Max 0.0936 0.0814 -0.0009 0.0434
N = 27,898
aResults from applying a variation of Rossin-Slater’s two step approach; the first step uses a probit model and the second step uses GLS. “LPM+GLS refers to estimates
using LPM in the first stage and GLS in the second stage on the 1999-2018 sample. “Probit+GLS” refers to estimates using probit in the first stage and GLS in the
second on the 1999-2018 sample. See note from Table 2.1. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean, and minimum and maximum values are reported as well. Each
coefficient is from a separate regression, with standard errors below in parentheses. The data are from the 1999 to 2018 March CPS surveys. The sample is limited to
women in the adult civilian population aged 15 to 64 years. The sample is further limited to women who report working any usual number of hours in the last year.
The treatment group consists of women in CA with a youngest child aged < 1 year in the household. Comparison group 1 consists of women in CA with children
aged 5 to 17, comparison group 2 consists of women in CA with no children, comparison group 3 consists of women with youngest child < 1 year in FL, NY, and TX,
and comparison group 4 consists of women with youngest child < 1 year in all states except PFL states. All regressions control for age categories (<20, 20 to 29, 30
to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 59, and 60+), indicators for race and ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, black, Hispanic, other), indicators for marital status (married, divorced,
separated, widowed, never married), an indicator for being born in the U.S., indicators for education categories (< HS, HS, some college, college or more), and time
fixed effects. Specifications using the second comparison group include indicators for single years of youngest child’s age. Specifications using multiple states include
state fixed effects and state-year unemployment rates (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics). The estimated treatment effects are calculated using the Donald and Lang
(2007) two-step method. In the first step, each outcome is regressed on the full set of controls, survey year dummies, and the year dummies interacted with treatment
status, with no constant. V ar(π̂) is obtained from the first stage and is used to calculate ̂ρGLS in the second stage. ̂ρGLS coefficients and standard errors are reported.
Significance levels: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.
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Examining Tables 2.10, results are noticeably different than those those for the LPM and
GLS specification. When using the probit model in the first step, the analyses conducted
using comparison groups 1 and 2 result in effects that are considerably smaller in magnitude
and are statistically insignificant. However, results obtained using comparison groups 3
and 4 fare better; results are almost all slightly smaller in magnitude, but are statistically
significant across the board. For these comparison groups, interpretation of Rossin-Slater et
al.’s results are qualitatively unchanged.
Closer examination of the results using control groups 1 and 2 in Tables 2.10 reveals that
the large discrepancy between estimates using a LPM in the first stage and estimates using
a probit in the first stage may be driven at least in part by the nature of the data. In other
words, the outcome variable (maternity, family, other, and any leave usage) does not have
sufficient variation. For example, using the first comparison group, there are a number of
years in which none of the control women in the fifth and sixth age categories (i.e., 50-59
and 60+) take maternity leave. This means that the model may estimate infinite slopes for
the fifth age category and the intercept term (because the sixth age category is the omitted
category). Thus, while a LPM may not pick up on this, binary-outcome models may be
more sensitive, and results may be greatly impacted by the sporadic nature of the outcome
variable. This issue in the model is probably apparent in the specifications using control
groups 1 and 2 but not those using control groups 3 and 4 because the first two control
groups use women in CA who either have older children or no children. These women cover
a broader range of ages and so the data may result in observations in older age categories
that exhibit sporadic leave usage across years. On the other hand, control groups 3 and 4
use women with infants in other states. Looking at descriptive statistics for these groups, it
is clear that nearly 100 percent of these mothers are in the first through fourth age categories
(<20, 20-29, 30-39, and 40-49). Thus, for these specifications there may be fewer holes in
the data as women ages 40 to 49 or younger are more likely to be taking maternity or other
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forms of leave, whether in the control or treatement groups.
Given the findings in Tables 2.10, it may be instructive to re-estimate the specifications
using control groups 1 and 2 using a difference-in-difference (DID) framework instead of the
DL method. I estimate the model using a LPM as a baseline and then using a probit model
for comparison. I drop individuals in the fifth and sixth age categories (ages 50 and above)
and cluster standard errors at the year level. Results are shown in Table 2.11. I also present
estimates using control groups 3 and 4 and the DID approach with either a LPM or probit
model for completeness.12
Results for the first two comparison groups are much closer to those found by Rossin-
Slater et al. and to those from the DL approach that used a LPM in the first stage instead
of a probit or logit. For specifications using control groups 3 and 4, results are consistently
larger than those estimated using the DL method with either a LPM or probit in the first
stage and GLS in the second stage: Comparing the LPM estimates in Table 2.11 to those
in Table 2.10, 7 of the 8 DID estimates are greater in magnitude than the DL estimates.
Similarly, comparing the probit estimates, from Table 2.11 to 2.10, all 8 DID estimates are
greater in magnitude than the DL estimates.


















































Table 2.11: Effects of CA-PFL on Leave Taking: DID
Maternity leavea Family leave Other leave Any leave
LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0690*** 0.0743*** 0.0636*** 0.0587*** -0.0140* -0.0137** 0.0550*** 0.0560***
(0.0101) (0.0129) (0.0088) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0053) (0.0137) (0.0084)
Min 0.0105 0.0199 -0.0280 0.0307
Max 0.1403 0.0834 -0.0063 0.0810
N = 22,111
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0699*** 0.0614*** 0.0695*** 0.0780*** -0.0104 -0.0076 0.0596*** 0.0680***
(0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0092) (0.0055) (0.0084) (0.0055) (0.0153) (0.0097)
Min 0.0101 0.0436 -0.0173 0.0507
Max 0.1167 0.1374 -0.0053 0.1097
N = 28,249
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, NY, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0577*** 0.0576*** 0.0422** 0.0423*** -0.0232* -0.0241*** 0.0345** 0.0336***
(0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0063) (0.0038) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0048)
Min 0.0098 0.0112 -0.0555 0.0109
Max 0.1129 0.0708 -0.0091 0.0503
N = 5,062
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0451*** 0.0468*** 0.0386*** 0.0399*** -0.0194*** -0.0204*** 0.0256*** 0.0253***
(0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0032)
Min 0.0110 0.0127 -0.0409 0.0098
Max 0.0674 0.0561 -0.0028 0.0348
N = 27,810
aResults from using a difference-in-difference framework. Results for LPM and for probit within the DID framework are presented for each leave category. For Probit
specifications, marginal effects are evaluated at the mean, and minimum and maximum values are reported as well. Each coefficient is from a separate regression, with
standard errors below in parentheses. The data are from the 1999 to 2018 March CPS surveys. The sample is limited to women in the adult civilian population aged
15 to 49 years (individuals in age categories 5 and 6 are dropped). The sample is further limited to women who report working any usual number of hours in the last
year. The treatment group consists of women in CA with a youngest child aged < 1 year in the household. Comparison group 1 consists of women in CA with children
aged 5 to 17, comparison group 2 consists of women in CA with no children, comparison group 3 consists of women with youngest child < 1 year in FL, NY, and TX,
and comparison group 4 consists of women with youngest child < 1 year in all states except CA. All regressions control for age categories (<20, 20 to 29, 30 to 39,
40 to 49), indicators for race and ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, black, Hispanic, other), indicators for marital status (married, divorced, separated, widowed, never
married), an indicator for being born in the U.S., indicators for education categories (< HS, HS, some college, college or more), and time fixed effects. Specifications
using the second comparison group include indicators for single years of youngest child’s age. Standard errors are clustered at the year level for comparison groups 1
and 2, and at the state level for comparison groups 3 and 4. Significance levels: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.
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Taken together, the results from estimating the effect of CA-PFL on leave usage using
a variety of models suggest that while CA-PFL seems to have had a statistically significant
impact on leave usage across comparison groups, the magnitude of the estimated effect seems
to vary by the choice of model. Thus, while there may be more appropriate models than
the one chosen by Rossin-Slater et al., the analyses in this section indicate that effects are
nevertheless detectable using Rossin-Slater’s approach. Of the methodologies presented in
this section, the most appropriate one is the DL approach that uses a probit in the first
stage and GLS in the second. However, the nature of the data poses a challenge in applying
this methodoogy across all comparison groups. Thus, subsequent extensions will use the DL
method as applied by Rossin-Slater and the DL method using GLS in the second stage.
2.6 Extension: Examining NJ-PFL and RI-PFL
The third extension involves repeating the analysis for other PFL programs. Specifically, I
evaluate the impacts of NJ-PFL and RI-PFL. While these programs are less generous and
have not been in effect as long as California’s, comparing the impacts of these programs
allows me to show that effects of CA-PFL can be viewed as an upper bound on the impacts
of paid leave programs in the U.S.
New Jersey implemented its PFL program in 2009, offering up to 6 weeks of paid leave
for eligible employees. To be eligible, an employee must have worked a minimum of 20 weeks
or she must have earned a minimum of $8,500 during the 12 months preceding the PFL
claim. Employees are entitled to 67 percent of their average weekly wage, up to a weekly
maximum of $637. Like CA-PFL, NJ-PFL is administered through the state’s temporary
disability insurance program (TDI) and is funded exclusively by employees through payroll
deductions. NJ-PFL can be used for the birth of a new child, for bonding with an adopted
child, or for caring for an ill family member. While NJ-PFL does not offer job-protection, as is
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the case with CA-PFL, employees can receive benefits through NJ-PFL while simultaneously
taking FMLA (through which job-protection is guaranteed).13
Rhode Island implemented its PFL program in 2014, offering up to 4 weeks of paid leave
for eligible employees. To be eligible, an employee must have earned a minimum of $12,120
in Rhode Island and paid into the TDI fund. Alternatively, for those earning less than
$12,120, a separate set of criteria must be met for eligibility (Donovan, 2018). Employees
are entitled to 60 percent wage replacement, up to a weekly maximum of $831. RI-PFL is
also administered through the state’s TDI program and is financed through employee payroll
deductions. RI-PFL can be used to bond with a new child, a newly adopted child, or to care
for an ill family member. Unlike CA-PFL and NJ-PFL, RI-PFL does offer job protection.
The analysis uses only the sample that conditions on employment (i.e. women reporting
any work hours in the past year). The analysis is analogous to the one performed in Table
2.6. Results for the effect of NJ-PFL are presented in Table 2.12 and results for the effects
of RI-PFL are presented in Table 2.13. The “OLS” column gives estimates from applying
the DL method using a LPM in the first stage and OLS in the second stage (in other words,
the same methodology as Rossin-Slater et al. use in their work). The “GLS” column gives
estimates from applying the DL method using a LPM in the first stage and GLS in the
second stage.14
Table 2.12 and Table 2.13 present results for NJ-PFL and RI-PFL, respectively. Almost
all of the estimates are not statistically significant at any of the usual levels of significance,
suggesting that neither NJ-PFL nor RI-PFL has had a significant effect on leave-taking.
13See the website for the State of New Jersey’s Department of Labor and Workforce Development for more
details: https://www.nj.gov/labor/fli/worker/state/State landing page.html.
14I focus on these two approaches to avoid the problem that arises when using the DL method with a probit
in the first stage for specifications that use the first two control groups. Namely, the challenge in using the
first two control groups is that these groups contain women ages 50 and above who are very unlikly to take
maternity leave or other types of leave. As a result, for a handful of years in the data there are no women in
older age categories taking leave (in other words, for a handful of years, the outcome variable is equal to 0
across all women so that there is no variation in leave usage. This can greatly impact the resulting estimates
from the DL approach that uses a binary outcome model in the first stage.
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This may be due to at least two reasons. First, lessons from CA-PFL demonstrate that
awareness of California’s policy has been persistently low, even 10 years after the policy was
implemented. It is not unlikely that the same is true for NJ-PFL and RI-PFL, especially
given that these programs are newer. In other words, individuals may not be aware that
these policies exist and as such may not be taking advantage of benefits offered. Second, New
Jersey’s program and Rhode Island’s program are both much less generous that California’s
program. Thus, it may be the case that even for those who are aware of the PFL programs,


















































Table 2.12: Effects of NJ-PFL on Leave Taking, 1999-2018
Maternity leavea Family leave Other leave Any leave
OLS GLS OLS GLS OLS GLS OLS GLS
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0160 0.0594 0.0093 0.0275 -0.0111 0.0007 0.0049 0.0278
(0.0380) (0.0265) (0.0413) (0.0313) (0.0144) (0.0066) (0.0437) (0.0314)
N = 7,116
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0230 0.0579 0.0215 0.0333 -0.0020 0.0101 0.0210 0.0345
(0.0385) (0.0269) (0.0430) (0.0332) (0.0134) (0.0058) (0.0441) (0.0330)
N = 9,629
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0203 0.0415 -0.0012 0.0148 -0.0225 0.0016 -0.0022 0.0204
(0.0379) (0.0244) (0.0403) (0.0294) (0.0169) (0.0116) (0.1363) (0.0302)
N = 3,305
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0052 0.0331 -0.0089 -0.0008 -0.0175 -0.0036 -0.0123 -0.0037
(0.0358) (0.0228) (0.0381) (0.0278) (0.0142) (0.0044) (0.0398) (0.0277)
N = 26,120
aSee notes from Table 2.6 and Table 2.9. The “OLS” column gives estimates from applying the DL method using a LPM in the first stage and OLS in the second stage
on the 1999-2018 sample (in other words, the same methodology as Rossin-Slater et al. use in their work). The “GLS” column gives estimates from applying the
DL method using a LPM in the first stage and GLS in the second stage on the 1999-2018 sample. NJ-PFL is the treatment and other states with PFL programs are


















































Table 2.13: Effects of RI-PFL on Leave Taking, 1999-2018
Maternity leavea Family leave Other leave Any leave
OLS GLS OLS GLS OLS GLS OLS GLS
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0851 -0.0190 0.0688 -0.0408 -0.0329** -0.0192* 0.0522 -0.0526
(0.0587) (0.0305) (0.0817) (0.0311) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0599) (0.0351)
N = 4,820
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0869 -0.0166 0.0780 -0.0278 -0.0172 -0.0007 0.0697 -0.0170
(0.0591) (0.0303) (0.0571) (0.0219) (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0577) (0.0180)
N = 6,555
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0876 -0.0211 0.0609 -0.0412 -0.0435** -0.0137 0.0441 -0.0536
(0.0685) (0.0377) (0.0705) (0.0402) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0713) (0.0401)
N = 3,165
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0857 -0.0374 0.0664 -0.0533 -0.0348** -0.0099 0.0509 -0.0687
(0.0647) (0.0357) (0.0656) (0.0358) (0.0092) (0.0079) (0.0659) (0.0362)
N = 25,980
aSee notes from Table 2.6 and Table 2.9. The “OLS” column gives estimates from applying the DL method using a LPM in the first stage and OLS in the second stage
on the 1999-2018 sample (in other words, the same methodology as Rossin-Slater et al. use in their work). The “GLS” column gives estimates from applying the
DL method using a LPM in the first stage and GLS in the second stage on the 1999-2018 sample. RI-PFL is the treatment and other states with PFL programs are
dropped from the sample (CA, NJ, NY, WA, and DC). *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.
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2.7 Extension: Examining Mothers’ Employment at
the Extensive Margin
The fourth extension examines the impact of CA-PFL on women’s employment. Rossin-
Slater et al. present results for the effect of CA-PFL on women’s labor force status but they
only examine the categories “on leave”, “with job and at work”. and “not employed”. None
of these results are statistically significant in their analysis, but the signs on the estimated
coefficients are all in line with the story the authors tell: CA-PFL increases leave taking and
thus reduces the number of women employed and at work, and by allowing some women to go
on leave instead of quitting their jobs, CA-PFL lowers the proportion of women categorized
as “not employed”. However, this analysis is silent on the potential impact of CA-PFL on a
woman’s decision to work or not work (i.e., on the effect of CA-PFL on women’s labor force
participation at the extensive margin). To fill this void, I examine the effect of CA-PFL
on the proportion of mothers in Calfiornia who have children less than a year old and are
in the labor force.15 If CA-PFL is effective in helping mothers balance work and family, I
expect CA-PFL to raise the proportion of women participating in the labor force as more
women stay employed or join the labor force. Confirming this prediction also lends support
to another hypothesis, namely, that a lack of family-friendly work policies may push women
out of the workforce and that PFL may be a valuable tool in enabling these women to work.
The Donald and Lang procedure is carried out much like in previous sections of this
chapter, but because the outcomes of interest pertain to employment outcomes, I do not
condition the sample on employment; rather the sample contains all women in a given
15The choice to focus on women in the labor force regardless of whether they are employed or not is motivated
by the concern that the category of employed women may not fully capture the number of women for whom
the policy may have led them to want a job. As Das and Polachek (2015) show, CA-PFL may have led
to higher unemployment rates for mothers and so focusing on mothers who are employed may leave out
the mothers who are incentivized by CA-PFL to join the workforce but who cannot find jobs. In this way,
the analysis presents a more accurate picture of the full effects of CA-PFL on women’s incentives to supply
labor.
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category (e.g., with infant or with children older than 5). In other words, I focus on the full
sample that does not condition on employment. The regression model is as before, but the
outcome variable is now a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the woman is in the labor force
and is 0 otherwise. Regressions control for year fixed effects, age, race, education, marital
status, and whether the person is born in the United States. Specifications using the fourth
control group also control for state fixed effects and state-year unemployment (as before).
Table 2.14 presents estimates of the effect of CA-PFL on the proportion of mothers with
children less than a year old, reporting being in the labor force. In light of the results in
the previous section, various estimation models are used for all four comparison groups to
evaluate the robustness of estimated effects. Using the first control group and the Donald
and Lang approach with LPM in the first stage and GLS in the second stage, CA-PFL
leads to a 5.4 percentage point increase in the proportion of women reporting being in the
labor force. On a pre-treatment average labor force participation rate of 46.63 percent, this
change implies an 11.5 percent increase in labor force particiation at the extensive margin.
This effect is statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.10. Estimates are fairly close
across estimation models. Results from using the first control group are also close to those
from using the third control group. Effects are larger when using the second control group.
Also, when examining the impact using the fourth control group, results are much smaller in
magnitude (e.g., the LPM + GLS estimate indicates a 3.2 percentage point increase which




















































Table 2.14: Effects of CA-PFL on Labor Force Participation






DID: LPM DID: Probit
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0499* 0.0539* 0.0491* 0.0531**
(0.0255) (0.0216) (0.0255) (0.0183)
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0575** 0.0636** 0.0610** 0.0823***
(0.0257) (0.0206) (0.0253) (0.0200)
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0500 0.0512* 0.0512 0.0522*
(0.0371) (0.0272) (0.0355) (0.0258)
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0194 0.0321* 0.0252 0.0242
(0.0217) (0.0193) (0.0206) (0.0149)
aSee notes in Tables 2.1, 2.6, and 2.8. Each column reports estimates with standard errors below in parentheses. The model is as described in the text and all
specifications controls for age, race, education, marital status, whether the individual is born in the U.S., and time fixed effects. “DL: LPM+OLS” shows results from
using the Donald and Lang procedure with a LPM in the first stage and OLS in the second stage on the 1999-2018 sample. “DL: LPM+GLS” shows results from using
the Donald and Lang procedure with a LPM in the first stage and GLS in the second stage. “DID: LPM” shows results from using a difference-in-difference approach
with a LPM. “DID: Probit” shows results from using a difference-in-difference approach with a probit model. Specifications using the first comparison group also control
for age of youngest child, and specifications using the fourth comparison group also control for state fixed effects and state-year unemployment rate as calculated by
the BLS. Sample sizes are 36,717 when the first comparison group is used, 62,360 when the second comparison group is used, 8,682 when the third comparison group
is used, and 41,909 when the fourth is used. The DID: Probit specification drops mothers in the fifth and sixth age categories (as explained in Section 2.5 of the text)
so sample sizes are 31,621, 47,457, 8,648, and 41,773. Inference is conducted using Student’s t-distribution with 18 degrees of freedom for specifications using the DL
method. Significance levels: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.
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As suggested by the literature on the effects of taxes on labor force participation, married
women have more elastic labor supply than other individuals (married men, single women,
and single men). Thus, it is interesting to estimate the impact of CA-PFL on labor force
participation at the extensive margin by marital status. I estimate regressions identical to
those presented in Table 2.14, conditioning on marital status and present these estimates in
Table 2.15. Taken together, the results to suggest that CA-PFL may have had a positive
impact on married women in particular.
The effect of CA-PFL on married women’s labor force particiation can be visualized
in Figure 2.3 which shows a plot of π̂t, regression adjusted differences in married women’s
labor force participation between treatment and the first control group.16 Examining trend
lines for the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods in Figure 2.4, prior to CA-PFL,
the magnitude of the difference in labor force participation between treatment and control
women was increasing (the π̂t trends downward but is negative). The pre-2005 trend line
suggests that control women had higher labor force participation rates than treated women
and that differences in labor force participation between treated and control women were
increasing. The post-2005 trend line shows a decrease in the magnitude of the differences
in labor force participation between treated and control women (the differences become less
negative) before differences turn positive indicating that treated women have higher labor
force participation rates than control women (after controlling for other factors).
Taken together, the employment results suggest that PFL may have a positive effect on
women’s labor force participation at the extensive margin. Furthermore, the results suggest
that CA-PFL may have incentivized married women in particular to join the labor force.
This is consistent with CA-PFL increasing workplace flexibility, thereby making it easier for
16As in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the horizontal lines are calculated by regressing π̂t on the POST indicator for
the relevant time period. In other words, for the pre-treatment period, this includes the years 1999 to 2004
and for the post-treatment period, this includes the years 2005 to 2018. Regressions are weighted using the
relevant CPS weights.
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Figure 2.3: Regression-adjusted Differences in Married Women’s Labor Force Participation
between Treatment and Control 1: Visualizing the Effect of CA-PFL
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Figure 2.4: Regression-adjusted Differences in Married Women’s Labor Force Participation
between Treatment and Control 1: Pre- and Post-CA-PFL Trends
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women to juggle family and work. These results also lend some tentative support to my
hypothesis that CA-PFL made it easier for women to work and as such may have an impact
on women’s expectations about future labor force participation and educational investments.
However, to thoroughly examine the effects of PFL on women’s labor force participation at
the extensive margin, a panel data set should be used in which many women are observed
over several years.
Given the estimates of employment effects for married women, it is interesting to examine
whether leave-taking effects of CA-PFL differ by marital status. Thus, I also re-estimate
Table 2.11 by marital status. Results are presented in Table 2.16. The estimates point to
strong effects for both married and single women. Interestingly, effects seem stronger for
single women than for married women for 3 of the 4 control groups. This suggests PFL may
be especially helpful in enabling single women to take leave. This may be because single
women may be more likely to face difficulties in affording unpaid leave.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter replicated Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) and extended their research in four
different directions. Obtaining replicated results that are close to the original estimates
serves as a useful verification of a central study on CA-PFL, and increases the comparability
between Rossin-Slater et al. and the extended research which uses the same data source.
Also, by extending the work of Rossin-Slater et al. with later years of data, I verify the
robustness of their estimates over time. Also, verifying the robustness of Rossin-Slater’s
results to various choices of estimation models both provides a range of plausible estimated
effects and also indicates that while the point estimates vary somewhat across specifications,
the statistical significance of the estimates and the general interpretation of the results
is consistent across the board. In addition, the results on NJ-PFL and RI-PFL and on
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Table 2.15: Effects of CA-PFL on Labor Force Participation by Marital Status





DID: LPM DID: Probit
Panel A. Married
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0691** 0.0754** 0.0684* 0.0753***
(0.0286) (0.0268) (0.0275) (0.0202)
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0537** 0.0641** 0.0599** 0.1239***
(0.0265) (0.0221) (0.0249) (0.0243)
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0641 0.0582* 0.0555 0.0580*
(0.0439) (0.0355) (0.0417) (0.0298)
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL
states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0144 0.0310 0.0229 0.0223
(0.0248) (0.0241) (0.0233) (0.0167)
Panel B. Single
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect -0.0349 -0.0357 -0.0343 -0.0332
(0.0388) (0.0451) (0.0391) (0.0269)
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect -0.0051 0.0011 -0.0019 0.0056
(0.0370) (0.0408) (0.0369) (0.0248)
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, TX
Estimated PFL effect -0.0111 -0.0193 -0.0073 -0.0095
(0.0487) (0.0570) (0.0482) (0.0322)
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL
states
Estimated PFL effect -0.0058 -0.0098 -0.0040 -0.0069
(0.0325) (0.0419) (0.0320) (0.0211)
aSee notes in Tables 2.1, 2.6, and 2.8. Each column reports estimates with standard errors below in parentheses. Model is as
described in the text and all specifications controls for age, race, education, marital status, whether the individual is born in
the U.S., and time fixed effects. “DL: LPM+OLS” shows results from using the Donald and Lang procedure with a LPM in
the first stage and OLS in the second stage on the 1999-2018 sample. “DL: LPM+GLS” shows results from using the Donald
and Lang procedure with a LPM in the first stage and GLS in the second stage. “DID: LPM” shows results from using a
difference-in-difference approach with a LPM. “DID: Probit” shows results from using a difference-in-difference approach with
a probit model. Specifications using the first comparison group also control for age of youngest child, and specifications using
the fourth comparison group also control for state fixed effects and state-year unemployment rate as calculated by the BLS.
Using the first comparison group, sample size is 26,542 when conditioning on married women, and 4,219 when conditioning on
single women. Using the second comparison group, sample size is 19,298 when conditioning on married women, and 35,409
when conditioning on single women. Using the third comparison group, sample size is 6,310 when conditioning on married
women, and 1,890 when conditioning on single women. Using the fourth comparison group, the sample size is 30,389 when
conditioning on married women and 9,287 when conditioning on single women. The DID: Probit specification drops mothers in
the fifth and sixth age categories (as explained in Section 2.5 of the text) so sample sizes are 22,954, 10,928, 6,284, and 30,284
for the married sample and 3,967, 33,363, 1,888, and 9,274 for the unmarried sample. Inference is conducted using Student’s
t-distribution with 18 degrees of freedom for specifications using the DL method. Significance levels: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05,
***P < 0.001.
CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECTS OF PFL ON LEAVE USAGE AND EMPLOYMENT 73
Table 2.16: Effects of CA-PFL on Leave-Taking by Marital Status
Maternity leavea Family leave Other leave Any leave
LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit
Panel A. Married
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.0649*** 0.0903*** 0.0521*** 0.0395*** -0.0239** -0.0229** 0.0406* 0.0436***
(0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0078) (0.0201) (0.0125)
Min 0.0139 0.0206 -0.0584 0.0288
Max 0.1653 0.0558 -0.0115 0.0692
N = 17,830
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.0658*** 0.0774*** 0.0615*** 0.0705*** -0.0167 -0.0143* 0.0484** 0.0609***
(0.0141) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0093) (0.0111) (0.0075) (0.0202) (0.0123)
Min 0.0148 0.0324 -0.0220 0.0428
Max 0.1376 0.0986 -0.0076 0.0787
N = 12,883
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, NY, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0676** 0.0640*** 0.0457* 0.0449** -0.0383** -0.0413** 0.0292 0.0280
(0.0253) (0.0128) (0.0262) (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0176) (0.0342) (0.0234)
Min 0.0141 0.0141 -0.0882 0.0082
Max 0.1027 0.0672 -0.0084 0.0408
N = 3,687
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0411** 0.0412*** 0.0292* 0.0290** -0.0312** -0.0325** 0.0100 0.0081
(0.0152) (0.0105) (0.0155) (0.0111) (0.0126) (0.0118) (0.0242) (0.0186)
Min 0.0086 0.0029 -0.0546 0.0013
Max 0.0610 0.0408 -0.0185 0.0112
N = 20,307
Panel B. Single
Comparison group 1: Mothers of youngest children aged 5 to 17
Estimated PFL effect 0.1007*** 0.0737** 0.1132*** 0.1286 0.0286 0.0206 0.1283*** 0.1345
(0.0148) (0.0301) (0.0170) (0.1715) (0.0300) (0.2319) (0.0269) (0.5766)
Min 0.0036 0.0170 0.0044 0.0554
Max 0.1686 0.2590 0.0676 0.2453
N = 2,979
Comparison group 2: Women with no children
Estimated PFL effect 0.1073*** 0.0786*** 0.1157*** 0.1272*** 0.0099 0.0102 0.1147*** 0.1122***
(0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0147) (0.0110) (0.0215) (0.0131) (0.0225) (0.0109)
Min 0.0045 0.0832 0.0073 0.0897
Max 0.1552 0.1964 0.0199 0.1733
N = 19,457
Comparison group 3: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year in FL, NY, TX
Estimated PFL effect 0.0346* 0.0382 0.0424** 0.0475** 0.0291 0.0301** 0.0638** 0.0795**
(0.0195) (0.0366) (0.0135) (0.0154) (0.0316) (0.0092) (0.0250) (0.0260)
Min 0.0010 0.0056 0.0038 0.0233
Max 0.0864 0.0966 0.1601 0.1441
N = 1,070
Comparison group 4: Mothers of youngest children aged <1 year, all states except PFL states
Estimated PFL effect 0.0723*** 0.1021*** 0.0773*** 0.1103 0.0131 0.0142 0.0823** 0.1089***
(0.2363) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.5092) (0.0234) (0.0155) (0.0232) (0.0210)
Min 0.0217 0.0308 0.0057 0.0423
Max 0.1789 0.1770 0.0367 0.1620
N = 5,993
aSee notes from Table 2.11
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women’s labor force participation are interesting in their own right but also suggest that
future research on PFL in the U.S. should focus on CA-PFL which appears to have generated
the strongest effects. Furthermore, the employment results suggest that CA-PFL may indeed
have had an impact on women’s expectations of future labor force participation and motivates
research on the impact of CA-PFL on women’s educational investments.
Chapter 3
The Effects of California’s Paid
Family Leave Program on Schooling
and Fertility
3.1 Introduction
This study finds that CA-PFL may delay, but overall increase, educational investments of
young women in California. Human capital theory predicts that increasing the future pay-
outs of an investment in human capital should, all else equal, increase the optimal level
of investment (Mincer, 1974, Ben Porath, 1967). In other words, for an individual invest-
ing in schooling, if the return on the investment increases, or if the career length of the
individual increases (i.e., the stream of payouts increaess), optimal schooling will increase.
This prediction has been explored thus far in two ways. The first approach has focused
on the relationship between expected earnings and schooling investments (Hill, 1979, Willis
and Rosen, 1979). The second approach has sought variation in expectations about life
expectancy to estimate the impact of an increase in expectations about career length on
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subsequent educational investment (Oster et al., 2013, Jayachandran et al., 2009).
Another related channel through which schooling may be impacted is an increase in ex-
pected career length due to changes in expectations about labor force participation (Goldin,
2006). In other words, if an individual expects to stay in the labor force for 45 years, then all
else equal, her optimal level of schooling will be higher than that of another who expects to
stay in the labor force for less than 45 years. This channel shares similarities with, but is not
identical to, the one by which an individual’s life expectancy affects her schooling decisions,
and has not yet been modeled or tested. Such a task is complicated because without ex-
ogenous variation in expectations about labor force participation, the relationship between
expectations of labor force participation and schooling decisions is hard to isolate from other
confounding effects. More specifically, an individual’s schooling decision is a function of her
characteristics (observed and unobserved alike) including her health, marital status, and
number of children, the wage that she expects to earn, or currently earns, in the labor mar-
ket, and her expectations about future career length (of which expectations about labor force
participation will be one factor). However, personal characteristics are correlated with ex-
pectations about labor force involvement and with educational attainment since individuals
self select into both. Thus, individuals will self select into various schooling levels because of
factors that simultaneously influence expectations about career length. Therefore, to obtain
unbiased estimates of the effect of expectations about labor force participation on schooling,
one needs variation in expected labor force participation that is exogenous to individuals’
characteristics. The source of variation in my model addresses the endogeneity concern by
fulfilling this necessary condition.
Specifically, I use California’s paid family leave program (CA-PFL) as a source of ex-
ogenous variation, and I argue that the program may change expectations about expected
career length for women.1 The program, which has been in effect since 2004, is the first in
1While I do provide some evidence that CA-PFL’s effects on schooling may be operating via this channel,
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the country to provide women with state-mandated paid family leave (PFL), which includes
maternity leave among other forms of leave. Eligibility for the program is nearly univer-
sal (Milkman and Appelbaum, 2011) which renders this program relevant to young adults
forming expectations about future labor-force participation. If in the absence of paid leave,
having children can lead a mother to reduce or even terminate her career by dropping out
of the labor force, then I expect California’s policy to enable women to stay at work longer
and for this to change expectations about career length.
This study makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, my analysis provides
a test of the standard human-capital model in a new setting, which contributes to the
literature, which has thus far examined the model from other angles (namely expected-
earnings and life-expectancy channels). Second, this study also contributes to the literature
on the effects of paid leave, and more specifically, on the small literature analyzing the effects
of CA-PFL. Much of the research conducted on this policy thus far has focused on its impact
on labor force participation (Rossin-Slater et al., 2013, Baum and Ruhm, 2016) and maternal
health (Rossin, 2011). I contribute to this literature by exploring the effect of the policy on
schooling outcomes. My hypothesis is that, as predicted by a human-capital model, CA-PFL
increases schooling investments.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
3.2.1 Childbearing and Women’s Employment
Before estimating the impact of CA-PFL on schooling, I present evidence to support the
hypothesis that driving the relationship between CA-PFL and schooling is a change in ex-
effectively I estimate a “reduced form” model in the sense that the model I estimate looks at the direct
effect of CA-PFL on women’s educational investment, and so I cannot rule out other channels through which
effects may occur.
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pectations about future career length. In other words, I set out to demonstrate that childbirth
can indeed create an interruption in a woman’s career and that CA-PFL can mitigate these
career interruptions. With this basis, it is reasonable to suggest that CA-PFL may also have
an impact on schooling.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that childbirth, and parenthood more generally, can lead to
career interruptions that shorten overall time spent in the labor force; it is well documented
that for women who want to have a family and a career, juggling both of these (often
competing) roles is difficult. For example, in a series of in-depth interviews, Stone (2008)
finds that 36 out of 54 stay-at-home mothers would rather be at work but were “pushed
out” of the labor force because of workplace inflexibilities. In addition, the Working Mother
Research Institute (2011) finds that in a sample of 3,781 self-identified “career-oriented”
stay-at-home mothers, over half would prefer to be working but made the decision to opt
out of the labor force because of the difficulty in balancing work and family responsibilities.
Furthermore, the proportion of mothers in the U.S. who are stay-at-home has risen slightly
in the last years from 23 percent in 1999 to 29 percent in 2012, which is consistent with a
hypothesis that while women may have entered increasingly demanding work environments,
these environments may not have caught up in addressing the particular needs of working
mothers. An interesting framework for thinking about the struggle between home and work is
presented by Benabou and Tirole (2011) who develop a model to explain competing identities
and oppositional behavior. Applied to the current context, a mother struggles between
choosing to invest her time and resources in her family or in her job. The implication is that
these two roles conflict because allocating resources to one necessarily removes resources from
the other. Although this struggle is ongoing, it is especially difficult at childbirth, when a
mother may need to take time off from work to recover from the ordeal and may also want to
take time off to bond with her new child. Thus, I focus on this point in time as a crossroad
when the mother faces a costly decision.
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Examining Current Population Survey (CPS) data on women who report working in
the previous year, I find that, controlling for education, race, and marital status, as well
as state and year fixed effects and state-year unemployment, women with infants aged less
than one are significantly less likely to be in the labor force and significantly less likely to
be at work in the preceding week. Further conditioning on women who report working part-
time in the preceding week, mothers with infants are also less likely to usually be working
full-time.2 These results are consistent with childbearing having negative effects on women’s
employment. Furthermore, when examining the effects of having one or more children under
the age of 5, the effects have smaller magnitudes but are statistically significant, indicating
that the negative employment effects of childbearing may have lasting consequences. This
preliminary evidence suggests that childbirth can indeed lead to interruptions in a woman’s
career that may lead to time away from work.
3.2.2 Modeling the Effect of PFL on Women’s Labor Force Par-
ticipation
While childbirth can lead to career interruptions that reduce the overall time a woman
spends in the labor market, PFL can mitigate these interruptions. To explain this further,
I sketch out a life-cycle model in which an individual maximizes her lifetime utility subject
to a budget constraint, and I show how PFL may factor into the model and impact both
the budget constraint and the probability of returing to work after childbirth which, all else
equal, should have a positive impact on optimal time in the labor force (and thus optimal
schooling investment).
To begin, it is useful to consider the work of Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) who provide
2In other words, individuals who report working part-time last week are asked a follow up question about
whether they usually work full-time. Mothers with infants are less likely than other women to usually be
working full-time.
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some guiding intuition for considering a mother’s choices at childbirth. In the absence of
any leave, a woman who gives birth has two immediate options at the time of birth. She
may choose to return to work without having taken any time off, or she may drop out of
the labor force (either temporarily or permanently), effectively reducing or ending her career
length. This decision will depend on the mother’s desired3 length of leave, which may be
determined by her wages, preferences and utility from staying home with a new child. If the
mother’s desired leave is greater than zero, she may choose to forgo her desired length of
leave in order to stay with her employer. In this case, the mother faces a cost from reducing
investment in her family, which may impose psychic costs as well as other pecuniary costs
such as childcare expenses. Alternatively, the mother can choose to take her desired length
of leave by quitting her job. In this case, the mother faces a cost of lost earnings, and
in the case where she rejoins the labor force, she may also face job-search costs as well as
lower wages and depreciation of skills. Klerman and Leibowitz show that mothers with more
job-specific human capital and higher wages will be more likely to choose the first option.
In the presence of unpaid leave, a third alternative exists. If the leave allowance is
greater than or equal to the mother’s desired leave duration, and the mother can afford to
take unpaid time off, then the mother will go on leave and return at the end of her leave. If
the mother cannot afford to forgo pay for the duration of the leave period, then the option
of unpaid leave does not change the mother’s set of feasible options and she will either stay
at work taking no leave, or she may quit her job. This point is especially relevant because
although the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) provides 12 weeks of unpaid
job-protected leave to eligible and covered employees, the requirements are strict and about
half of women are not covered by this law (Ruhm, 2011). Furthermore, there is evidence
3I use the word “desired” to refer to the duration of leave the mother would wish to take given no restrictions
on leave duration. i.e., the amount of leave that is optimal for a given mother maximizing her utility function
subject to a budget contraint in a world where she can take as much leave as she chooses without losing her
job.
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that low-income women disproportionately lack coverage under the FMLA, and that some
mothers who are covered by the FMLA cannot afford to take the time off without pay (Fass,
2009). Nevertheless, with unpaid leave, even if a mother can afford to take unpaid time off,
thereby allowing her to stay employed and resume wage-earning activities after the leave
expires, she still faces a sizable cost of lost wages for the length of time that she is on
leave, and may face additional costs if the leave is enough for skills to depreciate and job
advancement to be at risk.
The availability of PFL may affect the set of options available to a mother at childbirth,
and may thereby reduce the costs of childbirth. In other words, if a mother has access to
job-protected PFL, then the cost of lost wages is mitigated because the mother receives
partial wage replacements for the time that she is on leave. Furthermore, the availability of
PFL changes the options available to new mothers because mothers who previously dropped
out of the labor force because they could not afford to take unpaid leave may now be able
to stay at work and take paid leave instead. This is especially important because childbirth
occurs relatively early in a woman’s life and so providing women with solutions that enable
them to stay at work after childbirth may have a sizable impact on labor force participation.
Building on the work of Klerman and Leibowitz, Figure 3.1 maps out a flowchart for the
key decisions and possible outcomes over the life-cycle. Time in the flowchart is continuous
but can also be simplified to four periods. The flowchart models options under three sce-
narios. Case 1: mothers do not have access to either unpaid or paid leave; Case 2: mothers
have access to unpaid leave; and Case 3: mothers have access to paid leave. The first two
time periods are the same regardless of the scenario so I consider these together for all three
cases. The first period occurs from 0 ≤ t < s. This is the human capital investment period,
during which I assume for the sake of simplification that all schooling occurs. The second
period occurs from s ≤ t < c. This is a period during which an individual allocates her time
between work and leisure, earning a wage of wit = wit(Ss, wit−1) so that the working wage
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is a function of the level of schooling completed at t = s, and of the wage earned in the
previous period. I assume that all childbearing occurs at t = c, at which point a woman has
a maximum of a single child and does not have additional children later on in time. This
point in time marks the start of the third period (the possible leave-taking period) at which
point the three cases diverge and need to be considered separately.
Case 1: Mothers do not have access to either unpaid or paid leave. At t = c, the mother
has two options. The first option is to stay at work, earning her usual working wage of wit. I
assume that if she chooses to stay at work at this time, she will stay for the rest of her career
so that for periods three and four, from c ≤ t ≤ T , she is in the labor force. The second
option is she can quit and earn no income for a time, from c ≤ t < q (with the possibility
that q = T ), and then possibly rejoin the labor force in the fourth period, from q ≤ t ≤ T ,
and resume earning a wage of wit thereafter.
4
Case 2: Mothers have access to unpaid leave. At t = c, the mother has three options.
First, she can take unpaid leave during the third period, from c ≤ t < c + p, during which
time she earns no income. I assume that women who choose to take unpaid leave will rejoin
the labor force in the fourth period and earn the usual wage of wit.
5 The second and third
options are the same as in Case 1; the mother can either choose to keep working without
any leave, or she can quit with the possibility of rejoining at a later time.
Case 3: Mothers have access to paid leave. At t = c, the mother once again has three
options. First, she can take paid leave during the third period, from c ≤ t < c+ p. However,
unlike in the unpaid leave scenario, the woman will still be earning a wage of rwit during
the time that she is on leave. I assume, based on the PFL programs in existence in the U.S.,
that r < 1. In other words, while on PFL, women earn a fraction of their usual earnings.
4One might choose to let the wage in the fourth period be less than the usual wage because of the possibility
of skill-depreciation. To simplify exhibition, I assume that mothers who do return to work are not out of
work long enough for skills to depreciate.
5Unpaid leave through the Family and Medical Leave Act in the U.S. is capped at 12 weeks. Ruhm (1998)
finds that this is not long enough for wages to take a hit.
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Figure 3.1: Key Decisions and Possible Outcomes over the Life-cycle
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The second and third options are the same as in the first two cases; the mother may still
choose not to take any leave, or she may still choose to quit for a time or for the remainder
of her career.
I distinguish between three types of women. The first type of woman may want a career
and no children. The second may want children and no career. The third type of woman
may want both. It is the women in the third category that are of particular interest in
this study because it is this group that faces a tradeoff between time spent at home raising
children and enjoying a family life, and time spent at work earning a wage and building a
career. Therefore, I focus on modeling the decisions faced by this category of women.
A woman can allocate her time between four activities: work (h), leisure (l), maternity
leave-taking (m), and childrearing (g). Time spent on one activity is necessarily not spent on
another so that at a given point in time, ht + lt +mt + gt = 1. Time spent at work results in
wages, which can then be spent on goods that enter positively in the utility function. Time
spent on maternity leave or childrearing is an input in the production of child quality, Qt,
and has a positive effect on child quality. Time spent on maternity leave also enters directly
into the utility function, so that a woman benefit directly from this time, for example as an
investment in her recovery from childbirth. Time spent on leisure also provides utility. Thus,
in choosing to allocate time between these four activities, a woman faces tradeoffs. Time
spent at work earning a wage is not spent investing in child quality or on leisure. Similarly,
time spent on childrearing results in forgone wages and leisure. And time spent on leisure
means forgone wages and forgone investment in child quality.
The representative woman’s utility function is given by Ut = Ut(Ss, Cc,mt, Qt, Xt), where
Ss is schooling completed at t = s, Cc is parental status at t = c (Cc = 1 if the woman has
a child at t = c and is 0 otherwise), mt is time spent on paid leave, and takes on a value
of 1 from c ≤ t < c + p for women on paid leave, Qt is child quality and is a function of
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mt, gt, and child-rearing commodities, Rt with price PR, (Qt = Qt(mt, gt, Rt)),
6 and Xt is
a composite consumption good with price PX . I assume that for women who want to have
both children and a career, Ss, Cc,mt, Qt, and Xt provide positive utility. Given the utility
function, paid leave can have a direct positive effect on utility and an indirect positive effect
on utility through enhancing child quality.
The budget constraint will depend on whether there is paid leave or not. Let yt be income
at time t. E0 is an exogenous endowment that individuals receive at t = 0 which enables
those who pursue schooling to finance their education. Nt is exogenous non-wage income,
wt is the working wage, ht is time spent at work, mt is time spent on leave, i is the interest
rate, and r is the leave wage replacement rate. The budget constraint is the same in the
absence of any leave and with access to unpaid leave, so I consider the two together.
Cases 1 and 2: Mothers do not have access to either unpaid or paid leave; or mothers
have access to unpaid leave. Lifetime income for a representative woman is given by:
Y = E0 +
T∑
t=0
(1 + i)−t(Nt + wtht) (3.1)
Lifetime expenditures is similarly given by:
Y = PsSs +
T∑
t=0
(1 + i)−t(PxXt + PRRt) (3.2)




(1 + i)−t(PxXt + PRRt) = E0 +
T∑
t=0
(1 + i)−t(Nt + wtht) (3.3)
Case 3: Mothers have access to paid leave. Lifetime income for a representative woman
6Child quality is dependent on the time spent at home with the child. Note that childrearing time can come
in two forms. First, the mother can take paid leave (so that mt = 1). Second, the mother can allocate time
to childrearing by taking unpaid leave or forgoing work and leisure for a period of time after t = c (so that
gt = 1)
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is given by:
Y = E0 +
T∑
t=0
(1 + i)−t(Nt + wtht + rwtmt) (3.4)
Lifetime expenditures is the same as in the first two cases, so the lifetime budget constraint




(1 + i)−t(PxXt + PRRt) = E0 +
T∑
t=0
(1 + i)−t(Nt + wtht + rwtmt) (3.5)










βtUt(Ss, Ct, Xt, Cc ×mt, Cc ×Qt, ) (3.6)
subject to her budget constraint.
Thus, the optimization problem for cases 1 and 2 is:
max
{
LCU + λ(E0 − PsSs +
T∑
t=0
(1 + i)−t(Nt + wtht − PxXt − PRRt)
}
(3.7)
where LCU is given by equation (3.6), wt = wt(Ss, wt−1), Qt = Qt(gt, Rt), 0 < β < 1 is the
discount rate, and λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The woman chooses Ss, Cc, Xt, ht, gt, and Rt.
In the presence of paid leave, the optimization problem becomes:
max
{
LCU + λ(E0 − PsSs +
T∑
t=0
(1 + i)−t(Nt + wtht + rwtmt − PxXt − PRRt)
}
(3.8)
and the woman chooses Ss, Cc, Xt, ht, gt,mt, and Rt.
Although solving for the optimal sequence of leave-taking, {mt}, labor force participation,
{ht}, and the optimal level of schooling, Ss to complete at t = s is beyond the scope of the
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current work, this sketch provides some initial insights that are neverthless useful. It is
already evident from the equations above that PFL affects the budget constraint in a way
that unpaid leave does not. In other words, PFL provides partial compensation for leave-
taking time, mt which reduces the cost of investing in child quality. However, to consider
the full effects of PFL, one needs to consider the impact by type of women. In the absence
of paid leave, the first type of woman would have quit (and potentially rejoined at a later
date), forgoing income for either a period of time or the remainder of her career. The second
type of woman would have kept working regardless. For the first type of woman, PFL can
make a difference in the probability of employment after childbirth. Thus, for this category
of women, PFL may have implications for expectations about time spent in the labor force,
and may therefore have an impact on optimal schooling. However, for the second type of
woman, PFL may have a negative effect on lifetime earnings if in the presence of paid leave,
the woman chooses to take leave during which time she earns only a fraction of what she
would have earned had she not taken leave. It should also be noted that in this case, there
may be other benefits to PFL to be considered. In other words, PFL enters directly into
the utility function because it can have positive effects on mothers other than through the
budget constraint. For example, if paid leave helps mothers recover faster, avoid postpartum
depression, and invest in their overall health and wellbeing, all of those components can raise
utility but may also boost productivity and future wages.
Thus, it is clear that at least for the first type of woman, PFL can be helpful in mitigating
career interruptions, and this may have implications for optimal schooling.
3.2.3 Linking Career Length to Investment in Schooling
The effect of career length on optimal schooling investment is analyzed by Ben Porath
(1967) and later on by Mincer (1974). Ben Porath develops a model for the production
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of human capital using time inputs. Within this framework, investing in schooling results
in delaying wages earned in the labor market. Ben Porath solves the model for optimal
schooling and shows that it is an increasing function of career length. In other words,
all else equal, the longer the earning life of an individual, the higher the optimal level of
schooling. Mincer (1974) presents a model in which individuals maximize lifetime income.
Within this framework, an individual with a finite career length will have a higher level
of optimal schooling if his career length increases. Mincer’s work on the responsiveness
of schooling to changes in career length provides a useful starting point for predicting the
effect of California’s paid family-leave program. The availability of PFL under this program
may extend women’s career length by providing them with an option to stay in the labor
force and doing so at a much lower cost. Thus, if young women are forward looking and
make schooling choices that maximize lifetime earnings based on expectations about future
earnings and career length, then I would expect to find positive effects of the policy on
schooling.
On the other hand, PFL can also reduce incentives to pursue more education in ways
that are not expressed in the model described by equations (3.1) through (3.8). For example,
if in the absence of a PFL policy women realize that to land a “good” job that will provide
either PFL or other types of family-oriented benefits and flexibility they must invest in more
schooling, then wide-spread availability of PFL can reduce the optimal level of schooling.
Thus, the effect of PFL on schooling may either be positive or negative, or even zero if these
competing effects offset each other.
Furthermore, with job-protected leave, job-specific skills may become more valuable as
women are able to retain their jobs. These skills are more likely to be learned on the job
than at school. Thus, PFL with job protection can lead to a decline in formal schooling.
Also, while beyond the scope of the current work, this prediction is consistent with CA-PFL
leading more women to pursue occupations with high on-the-job skill formation, such as
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engineering.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Exploiting a Natural Experiment
I use CA-PFL as a source of exogenous variation to identify the effect of PFL on schooling. In
2002, California became the first state to pass legislation mandating PFL. In 2004, CA-PFL
was implemented, offering employees up to six weeks of partially paid leave, at a replacement
rate of 55 percent. The replacement rate was increased in 2018 to approximately 60 to 70
percent, up to a weekly maximum of $1,216. The paid leave program was designed to extend
California’s State Disability Insurance (SDI, previously called TDI) program, and is financed
by an employee payroll-tax system. Like the TDI program, CA-PFL does not provide job-
protection. However, employees who are also eligible for job-protected (but unpaid) leave
under FMLA can apply for paid leave under CA-PFL, and use the benefits in conjunction
with the job-protection covered by FMLA. In addition, new mothers can file for 6 weeks
of paid leave under disability insurance (with the certification of her physician) and for an
additional 6 weeks of benefits under paid leave. However, the two may not be used together;
i.e., the mother may file for both but can only be on one of the programs at a time.7
In spite of its status as the first PFL program in the U.S., awareness of CA-PFL, par-
ticularly in the years immediately after implementation, has been low. In response to the
research indicating that awareness of CA-PFL is low, especially for disadvantaged women
(Milkman and Appelbaum, 2013), California launched an awareness campaign in February
2017. As part of this campaign, radio and TV ads were broadcasted in English and Spanish
throughout the state. Low awareness of CA-PFL may bias estimates of the policy’s effects
7This information was provided by California’s Employment Development Department through email com-
munication that took place on December 14, 2015.
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towards zero if women are not aware of the program and, therefore, do not behave any
differently. Thus, I also estimate the impact of CA-PFL on schooling using the awareness
campaign launched in 2017 as another source of variation that I can exploit.
3.3.2 Data
I use March Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the years 1999 to 2018. The CPS
database is a large and nationally-representative sample that provides adequate variation
and is well-suited to this study. Also, these data have been used in previous studies of CA-
PFL and conducting further research using these data increases comparability. I limit the
sample to women civilians in the U.S. aged 18 to 35.
I start out by defining treated individuals in a general way: California women observed
in 2005 and after are classified as treated. All other women are classified as controls. In
subsequent analyses, I try an alternative more refined definition: Treated individuals are de-
fined as women in California who were below an age threshold at the time of the treatment
implementation (e.g., 2005 for CA-PFL implementation). For example, using an age thresh-
old of 22 years old or younger at the time of implementation of CA-PFL, treated individuals
are classified as those who are ages 18 to 22 in 2005, 18 to 23 in 2006, and so on. In other
words, the age range for treated individuals varies each year. For specifications that use this
modifed treatment classification, I present results with different age thresholds to evaluate
the sensitivity of the results to the choice of age threshold.
The control group consists of women ages 18 to 35 in California prior to CA-PFL and
those in other states excluding New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, New York, and Wash-
ington D.C. (because these states and D.C. passed paid family leave programs during the
sample period). Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics with means and standard deviations
of demographic variables for the treatment and control groups pre and post 2005 for the
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general treatment classification
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Treatment Control
Pre-2005 Post-2005 Pre-2005 Post-2005
Years of education 12.71 13.20 13.07 13.38
(2.93) (2.68) (2.29) (2.33)
Age 26.56 26.44 26.67 26.52
(5.22) (5.20) (5.26) (5.19)
Black 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.16
(0.24) (0.23) (0.32) (0.33)
White 0.78 0.74 0.79 0.76
(0.40) (0.42) (0.38) (0.41)
Other 0.16 0.19 0.05 0.08
(0.35) (0.38) (0.24) (0.28)
Married 0.42 0.35 0.44 0.38
(0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49)
Single 0.51 0.59 0.47 0.55
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
U.S. born 0.65 0.72 0.89 0.87
(0.48) (0.45) (0.30) (0.32)
At work 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.65
(0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.47)
Number children 0.90 0.74 0.94 0.86
(1.22) (1.14) (1.19) (1.19)
Parent 0.45 0.38 0.49 0.44
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Sample size 7,736 19,376 73,178 167,370
3.3.3 Identification Strategy
The empirical strategy in this paper relies on exogenous variation induced by CA-PFL.
Through the lens of a human-capital model, I look at CA-PFL as exogenous variation in
expected career length, which is induced by the availability of PFL in California. Empirically,
however, I am estimating the ”reduced form” effect of CA-PFL on schooling, so I cannot
rule out other channels through which effects may occur.
The DID approach relies on a parallel trend assumption. In other words, I assume that
in the absence of the policy change, trends for women in California and women in other
states are the same. Note that this does not mean that outcomes must be the same; level
differences between the treatment and the control groups are differenced out and do not pose
a problem. Another assumption I make for this approach to be valid is that the enactment
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of the policy is indeed exogenous. If the policy implementation were somehow related to
substantial education reforms, the approach would be invalid.
I conduct two main analyses. The first analysis pools individuals of all ages to estimate
the effect of CA-PFL on years of schooling obtained. The second analysis examines age
cohorts separately, allowing for different estimates across all parameters for each age cohort.
The main model I estimate is given below.
Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2TREATi + β3POSTt + β4TREATi × POSTt
+β5Age× POSTt + β6Age× TREATi + β7Age× TREATi × POSTt
λUEst + θs + λt + εist
(3.9)
Yist is years of schooling attained by individual i, observed at time t, in state s; Xist is a
vector of demographic characteristics that includes the following variables: age dummies,
race, marital status, and whether the individual is born in the U.S.; TREATi is an indicator
equal to 1 for women in California and is 0 otherwise; POSTt is an indicator equal to 1 if
the individual was surveyed after the treatment year; and εist is the regression disturbance
term. Age is interacted with the TREAT, POST, and TREAT ×POST indicators to allow
for heterogeneous effects across the age distribution. The model includes time fixed effects,
λt, state fixed effects, θs, and state-year unemployment, UEst (from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics). Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The coefficients of interest are β4 which measures the effect of CA-PFL on young women’s
schooling attainment post-treatment relative to pre-treatment and relative to that of young
women in other state, and β7 which interacts the treatment effect with Age.
The analysis that examines the additional effects of the awareness campaign follows the
same general form but allows for a second post-treatment period, POST2t which takes on
a value of 1 for the years 2017 and 2018. Thus, there is also a second treatment effect that
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results from interacting treatment status with the second post variable. In other words, the
model estimated is given by:
Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2TREATi + β3POST1t + β4POST2t
+β5TREATi × POST1t + β6TREATi × POST2t
+β7Age× POST1t + β8Age× POST2t + β9Age× TREATi
+β10Age× TREATi × POST1t + β11Age× TREATi × POST2t
+λUEst + θs + λt + εist
(3.10)
The coefficients of interest for estimating the effect of CA-PFL on schooling are β5 which
measures the effect of CA-PFL on young women’s schooling attainment post-treatment rel-
ative to pre-treatment and relative to that of young women in other states and β10 which
interacts the treatment effect with age. The coefficients of interest for estimating the effect
of the awareness campaign on schooling are β6 which measures the effect of the awareness
campaign and β11 which interacts the treatment effect with Age.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Effects of CA-PFL on Schooling: General Treatment
The analyses conducted in this section all use a general classification of treated observations.
In other words, treated women are defined as California women observed in years 2005 and
after (ages 18 to 35). All other women observed are classified as control units. The first
analysis is of the effect of the implementation of CA-PFL in 2004 on educational attainment
for women ages 18 to 35 in California. Results are shown in Table 3.2. Each of the three
columns pertains to a different regression specification: the first specification is a DID with
no controls, the second includes demographic controls, state-year unemployment, as well as
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time fixed effects and state fixed effects. The third expands on the second specification by
interacting treatment variables with age. Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at
the state level.
Table 3.2: The Effects of CA-PFL on Schooling, Pooled Ages, General Treatment
Dependent Variable: Years of educationa (1) (2) (3)
Regressors:
TREAT × POST 0.172*** 0.037 -0.299***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.048)
Age × TREAT × POST 0.013***
(0.002)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes
N = 267,660
.
aRegression results from estimating equation (3.9) on women ages 18 to 35 in the U.S. for the years 1999 to 2018. Treated
women are women in CA-PFL observed in 2005 and after. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC are dropped. Each
column pertains to a different specification as described in the text. Standard errors are reported below regression estimates
and are clustered at the state level. Control variables include: age dummies, race, marital status, whether the person is born
in the U.S., and state-year unemployment rates. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
The results in Table 3.2 show that CA-PFL had a statistically significant effect on
women’s schooling that increases with age. The estimated coefficient on the treatment
effect, POST × TREAT is -0.299 which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
and the coefficient on the treatment effect interacted with age is 0.013 which is also statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level. Calculating the treatment effect for the youngest
individuals and the oldest individuals in the sample gives an idea of the range of estimated
treatment effects by age. For example, for an 18-year old woman, CA-PFL leads to a de-
cline in schooling of -0.065 years. For a 35-year old woman, CA-PFL leads to an increase
of 0.156 years of schooling. Thus the estimated effects suggest that the effects are indeed
heterogeneous by age; CA-PFL had a negative impact on schoooling for younger individuals
but had a positive effect for older individuals. A possible explanation for these results is
that CA-PFL increased the returns to working and as such, led younger women to delay
schooling. But ultimately, because CA-PFL may help minimize career interruptions over
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the course of a woman’s lifetime, returns to investing in schooling may be higher and women
may invest overall in more schooling in spite of the initial delay.
The second analysis examines the effect of CA-PFL on women by age cohorts in a separate
regression for each age cohort. This analysis allows the effects to vary by age cohort but
also allows for different parameter estimates for the other regression variables. I define an
age-cohort as a 5-year pooled age group, starting the first cohort with age 18. Table 3.3
shows the ages included in each of the 14 age cohorts. The age cohorts overlap to allow for a
“moving average” type of analysis that should minimize the jagged profile of the treatment
effect by age.
Table 3.3: Age Cohorts: General Treatment Classification
Age Cohort Age Range
Age Cohort 1 Ages 18-22
Age Cohort 2 Ages 19-23
Age Cohort 3 Ages 20-24
Age Cohort 4 Ages 21-25
Age Cohort 5 Ages 22-26
Age Cohort 6 Ages 23-27
Age Cohort 7 Ages 24-28
Age Cohort 8 Ages 25-29
Age Cohort 9 Ages 26-30
Age Cohort 10 Ages 27-31
Age Cohort 11 Ages 28-32
Age Cohort 12 Ages 29-33
Age Cohort 13 Ages 30-34
Age Cohort 14 Ages 31-35
By examining age cohorts individually, I can deepen the insights gathered from the effects
detected in Table 3.2. Table 3.4 presents results for each of the 14 age cohorts. The results
suggest that the effects of CA-PFL on schooling may be driven by effects for individuals
in age cohorts ranging from age 21 to 32. The largest estimated effects are for the 28-32
age cohort; CA-PFL is estimated to lead to an additional 0.122 years of schooling for this
age group. This estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and corresponds
to around 1.5 months of schooling. It is interesting to note that effects seem to be stronger
towards the middle of the age distribution. Furthermore, while estimates at both ends of
the age distribution are statistically insignificant, estimates for the two younger cohorts have
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negative signs while those for the older cohorts have positive signs, which is consistent with
the results from Table 3.2, suggesting that effects are positive for older cohorts but not for
younger cohorts. Also, the stronger effects at the center of the age distribution compared to
the right tail of the age distribution is consistent with older individuals having less elastic
schooling investments.
Table 3.4: The Effects of CA-PFL on Schooling, Age Cohorts, General Treatment
Dependent Variable: Years of education CAPFL Treatmenta Sample Size
Age Cohort:
Ages 18-22 -0.048* 71,232
(0.027)
Ages 19-23 -0.028 70,372
(0.030)
Ages 20-24 0.010 71,043
(0.026)
Ages 21-25 0.058** 71,751
(0.026)
Ages 22-26 0.071** 72,121
(0.032)
Ages 23-27 0.083** 72,412
(0.038)
Ages 24-28 0.112** 73,210
(0.036)
Ages 25-29 0.120** 73,822
(0.036)
Ages 26-30 0.096** 74,713
(0.034)
Ages 27-31 0.116** 75,667
(0.041)
Ages 28-32 0.122** 76,515
(0.043)
Ages 29-33 0.077* 77,129
(0.044)
Ages 30-34 0.081* 77,882
(0.042)
Ages 31-35 0.061 78,369
(0.040)
Demographic Controls Yes
State fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
aTreatment effects from estimating equation (3.9) on each birth cohort in a separate regression. Data for the years 1999 to 2018.
Treated women are women in CA-PFL observed in 2005 and after. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC are dropped. Each
of the first three columns pertains to a different specification. The column “CAPFL Treatment” reports estimated treatment
effects from a regression that includes demographic controls, state fixed effects, time fixed effects, and state-year unemployment.
Standard errors are reported below regression estimates and are clustered at the state level. Control variables include: age
dummies, race, marital status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year unemployment rates. * P < 0.10, ** P
< 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF CA-PFL ON SCHOOLING AND FERTILITY 97
3.4.2 The Effects of CA-PFL and the Awareness Campaign on
Schooling: General Treatment
In this section, I investigate whether the awareness campaign launched in 2017 had an addi-
tional impact on years of schooling obtained, beyond the effects of CA-PFL implementation
in 2004. This approach allows for a second post-treatment period in 2017 to test for addi-
tional effects of the awareness campaign beyond the effects of CA-PFL implementation in
2004. I define a second treatment group similarly to the way in which the first treatment
group is defined; for the following analysis, all women ages 18 to 35 in California observed
in 2017 and after are classified as treated. Later on, this treatment classification will be
modified. The model estimated in this analysis is the one given by equation (3.10) in which
there are two post periods (one for 2005 and after and one for 2017 and after) and thus
two treatment effects. As before, the model is first estimated pooling individuals of all ages.
Results are presented in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: The Effects of CA-PFL and the Awareness Campaign on Schooling, Pooled Ages,
General Treatment
Dependent Variable: Years of educationa (1) (2) (3)
Regressors:
TREAT × POST1 0.141*** 0.021 -0.197***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.054)
TREAT × POST2 0.208*** 0.104** -0.660***
(0.037) (0.043) (0.116)
Age × TREAT × POST1 0.008***
(0.002)
Age × TREAT × POST2 0.029***
(0.005)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes
N = 267,660
aRegression results from estimating equation (3.10) on women ages 18 to 35 in the U.S. for the years 1999 to 2018. There are two
treatments. For the first (CA-PFL), treated women are women in CA observed in 2005 and after. For the second (Awareness
Campaign (AC)), treated women are women in CA observed in 2017 and 2018. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC
are dropped. Each column pertains to a different specification as explained in the text. Standard errors are reported below
regression estimates and are clustered at the state level. Control variables include: age dummies, race, marital status, whether
the person is born in the U.S., and state-year unemployment rates. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
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The results in Table 3.5 show that CA-PFL and the awareness campaign both have a
statistically significant effect on women’s schooling which increases with age. The estimated
coefficient on the treatment effect for CA-PFL is -0.197, and the estimated coefficient on the
CA-PFL treatment effect interacted with age is 0.008, both of which are statistically signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. Once again calculating the treatment effects for the youngest
and oldest women in the sample gives an idea of the range of treatment effects across the age
distribution. For 18-year old women, CA-PFL leads to a decline of 0.053 years of schooling.
For 35-year old women, CA-PFL leads to an increase in 0.083 years of schooling. Compared
to the estimates in Table 3.2 these effects are smaller in magnitude suggesting that the esti-
mates in Table 3.2 possible captured some of the effects of the awareness campaign in 2017
and attributed these effects to CA-PFL implementation in 2004. However, the interpreta-
tions are the same; these results indicate that CA-PFL had a negative effect on schooling
for younger individuals but a positive effect on schooling for older individuals.
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient on the treatment effect for the awareness campaign
is -0.660, and the estimated coefficient on the awareness campaign treatment effect interacted
with age is 0.029, both of which are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Calculating
the treatment effects for 18-year olds, the awareness campaign led to a decline of 0.138 years
of schooling. However, for 35-year old women, the awareness campaign led to an increase
of 0.355 years of schooling. These results suggest that the awareness campaign in 2017 had
additional effects on women’s schooling beyond the effects of CA-PFL implementation. Low
awareness of CA-PFL in California possibly dampens the estimated effects of CA-PFL on
schooling. Thus, these results suggest that boosting awareness of CA-PFL may indeed lead
to substantial increases in schooling for women.
The analysis is also repeated using age cohorts instead of pooled ages. Results are pre-
sented in Table 3.6. Once again, estimates for younger cohorts are negative while those for
older cohorts are positive, supporting differential effects of CA-PFL across the age distribu-
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tion. Interestingly, younger cohorts have statistically significant effects for CA-PFL while
older cohorts have statistically significant effects for the awareness campaign.
Table 3.6: The Effects of CA-PFL and the Awareness Campaign on Schooling, Age Cohorts,
General Treatment
Dependent Variable: Years of educationa CA-PFL AC Sample Size
Age Cohort:
Ages 18-22 -0.045* -0.018 71,232
(0.026) (0.045)
Ages 19-23 -0.025 -0.021 70,372
(0.027) (0.045)
Ages 20-24 0.012 -0.009 71,043
(0.025) (0.054)
Ages 21-25 0.061** -0.019 71,751
(0.026) (0.061)
Ages 22-26 0.080** -0.064 72,121
(0.030) (0.056)
Ages 23-27 0.074** 0.057 72,412
(0.037) (0.054)
Ages 24-28 0.099** 0.077 73,210
(0.034) (0.055)
Ages 25-29 0.114*** 0.034 73,822
(0.031) (0.060)
Ages 26-30 0.085** 0.062 74,713
(0.028) (0.068)
Ages 27-31 0.087** 0.173** 75,667
(0.038) (0.063)
Ages 28-32 0.090** 0.186** 76,515
(0.041) (0.064)
Ages 29-33 0.050 0.161** 77,129
(0.041) (0.069)
Ages 30-34 0.040 0.252*** 77,882
(0.041) (0.064)
Ages 31-35 0.012 0.300*** 78,369
(0.039) (0.050)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
aTreatment effects from estimating equation (3.10) on each birth cohort in a separate regression. Data for the years 1999 to
2018. There are two treatments. For the first (CA-PFL), treated women are women in CA-PFL observed in 2005 and after. For
the second (awareness campaign (AC)), treated women are women who are observed in 2017 and after. Observations in NJ, RI,
WA, NY, and DC are dropped. The first column gives the CA-PFL treatment effect. The second column gives the awareness
campaign treatment effect for age cohorts that contain individuals that are classified as having been exposed to the awareness
campaign. The third column gives the sample size for the age-cohort regression. Standard errors are reported below regression
estimates and are clustered at the state level. Control variables include: age, age-squared, race, marital status, employment
status, whether the person is born in the U.S., whether the person is a parent, and state-year unemployment rates. * P < 0.10,
** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
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3.4.3 The Effects of CA-PFL on Schooling: Modified Treatment
The analyses in the previous section treated all women ages 18 to 35 in California in the
years after 2005 as having been exposed to treatment. In this section, I use a modified
classification of treated observations. In other words, I classify California women as having
been exposed to treatment in a given year if they are under an age threshold. For example,
for an age threshold of 22, women in California are classified as treated if they are 22 years
or younger in 2005. 23 years or younger in 2006, 24 years or younger in 2007, and so on.
Table 3.7 shows the age range and sample sizes for the years 2005 to 2018 (prior to 2005
there are no treated individuals) for five different age thresholds (≤ 22,≤ 23,≤ 24,≤ 25, and
≤ 26). The reason for defining treatment in such a way is that it is arguably less plausible
that individuals who are already older at the time of treatment would respond by changing
their likely-finished schooling investments. Thus, focusing on individuals who are below a
certain age threshold at treatment may increase the plausibility that these individuals may















































Table 3.7: Treatment Classification: CA Women Exposed to CA-PFL
≤ 22 ≤ 23 ≤ 24 ≤ 25 ≤ 26
Year Ages Sample Ages Sample Ages Sample Ages Sample Ages Sample
2005 18-22 365 18-23 429 18-24 505 18-25 575 18-26 634
2006 18-23 465 18-24 536 18-25 618 18-26 689 18-27 771
2007 18-24 483 18-25 546 18-26 634 18-27 694 18-28 776
2008 18-25 594 18-26 679 18-27 760 18-28 842 18-29 919
2009 18-26 722 18-27 801 18-28 875 18-29 966 18-30 1,063
2010 18-27 791 18-28 876 18-29 955 18-30 1,053 18-31 1,147
2011 18-28 859 18-29 946 18-30 1,032 18-31 1,119 18-32 1,206
2012 18-29 951 18-30 1,035 18-31 1,115 18-32 1,202 18-33 1,274
2013 18-30 1,039 18-31 1,106 18-32 1,183 18-33 1,266 18-34 1,346
2014 18-31 1,154 18-32 1,224 18-33 1,312 18-34 1,407 18-35 1,493
2015 18-32 1,151 18-33 1,221 18-34 1,306 18-35 1,394 18-35 1,394
2016 18-33 1,238 18-34 1,319 18-35 1,408 18-35 1,408 18-35 1,408
2017 18-34 1,229 18-35 1,315 18-35 1,315 18-35 1,315 18-35 1,315
2018 18-35 1,239 18-35 1,239 18-35 1,239 18-35 1,239 18-35 1,239
Total = 12,280 Total = 13,272 Total = 14,257 Total = 15,169 Total = 15,985
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As before, I first examine the effects CA-PFL on schooling, pooling individuals ages 18
to 35. This analysis is akin to the one in Table 3.2 with a modified treatment definition.
Results are estimated using five different age thresholds for treatment classification. Results
are presented in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: The Effects of CA-PFL on Schooling, Pooled Ages, Modified Treatment
≤ 22 ≤ 23 ≤ 24 ≤ 25 ≤ 26
Dependent Variable: Years of educationa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressors:
TREAT × POST -0.286*** -0.308*** -0.402*** -0.428*** -0.545***
(0.061) (0.057) (0.057) (0.054) (0.057)
Age × TREAT × POST 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 267,660
aRegression results from estimating equation (3.9) on women ages 18 to 35 in the U.S. for the years 1999 to 2018. Treated women
are women in CA-PFL who are classified as having been exposed to CA-PFL (see Table 3.7). Column (1) uses a treatment age
threshold of 22; Column (2) uses a treatment age threshold of 23; Column (3) uses a treatment age threshold of 24; Column (4)
uses a treatment age threshold of 25; Column (5) uses a treatment age threshold of 26. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and
DC are dropped. Standard errors are reported below regression estimates and are clustered at the state level. Control variables
include: age dummies, race, marital status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year unemployment rates. * P <
0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
The estimates in Table 3.8 indicate that CA-PFL has a statistically significant effect on
schooling for women in California. The effects vary in magnitude across the five different
treatment classifications, but interpretations are consistent across the board. For example,
using each of the five treatment classifications in turn to calculate treatment effects for
18 year olds, all treatment classifications find a negative treatment effect, indicating that
CA-PFL had negative effects on schooling for 18-year old women (the calculated effects are
-0.052, -0.056, -0.096, -0.086, and -0.077 for the five treatment classifications respectively).
Calculating effects for 35- year old women, results are consistent with those from the general
treatment classification and indicate that CA-PFL led to increases in schooling for 35-year old
women (the calculated effects are 0.169, 0.182, 0.193, 0.237, and 0.260 for the five treatment
classifications respectively). These estimates are larger than those found using the general
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treatment classification, but interpretations remain the same.
Once again, I examine the effect of CA-PFL on women’s schooling by age cohorts, this
time using the modifed treatment classification. Because the modified treatment classifica-
tion limits the age range of treated individuals in certain years, the age-cohort regressions
do not have treated observations in certain years. Table 3.9 shows the 14 age cohorts and
years in which each age cohort contains treated observations for each of the five treatment
classifications. For example, the 31 to 35 year old age cohort with treatment defined as indi-
viduals who are 22 years or younger at the time of CA-PFL implementation, only contains
treated observations for the years 2014 to 2018. In other words, it is not until 2014 that
these young treated individuals are old enough to belong to this age cohort. In some sense,
relying on the higher age thresholds for treatment classifications allows for more treated
observations in earlier years which facilitates empirical work. However, there is a tradeoff
between choosing a higher age threshold that allows for more treatment data and choosing
an age that is young enough that one could plausibly argue that CA-PFL could elicit changes
in educational investments. Thus, I present results for a handful of treatment classifications
which allows the reader to see how effects may change or not.
Table 3.9: Age Cohorts: Modified Treatment Classification
Years with Treated Observations
Age Cohort Age Range ≤ 22 ≤ 23 ≤ 24 ≤ 25 ≤ 26
Age Cohort 1 Ages 18-22 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 2 Ages 19-23 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 3 Ages 20-24 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 4 Ages 21-25 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 5 Ages 22-26 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 6 Ages 23-27 2006-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 7 Ages 24-28 2007-2018 2006-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 8 Ages 25-29 2008-2018 2007-2018 2006-2018 2005-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 9 Ages 26-30 2009-2018 2008-2018 2007-2018 2006-2018 2005-2018
Age Cohort 10 Ages 27-31 2010-2018 2009-2018 2008-2018 2007-2018 2006-2018
Age Cohort 11 Ages 28-32 2011-2018 2010-2018 2009-2018 2008-2018 2007-2018
Age Cohort 12 Ages 29-33 2012-2018 2011-2018 2010-2018 2009-2018 2008-2018
Age Cohort 13 Ages 30-34 2013-2018 2012-2018 2011-2018 2010-2018 2009-2018
Age Cohort 14 Ages 31-35 2014-2018 2013-2018 2012-2018 2011-2018 2010-2018
Table 3.10 presents results from each age-cohort regression for each of the five treatment
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classifications. Examining the results, it seems that the estimated effects from the pooled
ages specification are driven largely by statistically significant positive effects of CA-PFL on
schooling for older age cohorts. This could be due in part to the fact that awareness of CA-
PFL was low at its inception and in the years immediately after so that behavioral changes
only come about in later years (for older cohorts) as awareness increases. These results are
consistent with previous results which have indicated that effects of CA-PFL on schooling
are larger for older women. Furthermore, the only statistically significant estimated effects
for age cohorts 20 to 24 and younger are negative: For age cohort 1 (ages 18-22), using
the first treatment classification, CA-PFL leads to a decline of 0.048 years of schooling.
This estimate is statistically significant at the 10 percent level and corresponds to about 0.6
months of schooling. For age cohort 3 (ages 20-24), using the first treatment classification,
CA-PFL leads to a decline of 0.064 years of schooling. This estimate is statistically significant
at the 5 percent level and corresponds to a decline of about 0.8 months of schooling for this
age group. These results are consistent with previous results which have found negative
effects for younger women.
Taken together, the results obtained from using a more refined treatment classification are
consistent with the interpretation that CA-PFL may have led young women in California
to delay schooling, but then overall, led to higher educational attainment for women in
California.
3.4.4 The Effects of CA-PFL and the Awareness Campaign on
Schooling: Modified Treatment
As before, I repeat the analyses on the pooled sample and specific age-cohorts allowing for a
second post-treatment period in 2017 to test for additional effects of the awareness campaign
beyond the effects of CA-PFL implementation in 2004. I define a second treatment group
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Table 3.10: The Effects of CA-PFL on Schooling, Age Cohorts, Modified Treatment
Dependent Variable: Years of educationa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Sample Size
Age Cohort:
Ages 18-22 -0.048* 71,232
(0.027)
Ages 19-23 -0.040 -0.028 70,372
(0.029) (0.030)
Ages 20-24 -0.064** -0.027 0.010 71,043
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Ages 21-25 -0.033 -0.003 0.019 0.058** 71,751
(0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
Ages 22-26 -0.059 -0.022 0.020 0.057* 0.071** 72,121
(0.043) (0.040) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032)
Ages 23-27 -0.012 0.002 0.024 0.085** 0.087** 72,412
(0.049) (0.047) (0.043) (0.039) (0.038)
Ages 24-28 0.000 0.031 0.018 0.107** 0.090** 73,210
(0.057) (0.050) (0.046) (0.039) (0.037)
Ages 25-29 0.011 0.030 0.000 0.079* 0.038 73,822
(0.063) (0.057) (0.054) (0.046) (0.044)
Ages 26-30 0.021 0.036 0.011 0.084* 0.029 74,713
(0.061) (0.056) (0.053) (0.046) (0.042)
Ages 27-31 0.059 0.053 0.014 0.068 0.050 75,667
(0.062) (0.060) (0.059) (0.054) (0.051)
Ages 28-32 0.028 0.025 -0.005 0.023 0.057 76,515
(0.061) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.058)
Ages 29-33 0.057 0.036 0.011 0.007 0.058 77,129
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.056) (0.052)
Ages 30-34 0.119** 0.044 0.057 0.059 0.133** 77,882
(0.054) (0.057) (0.055) (0.051) (0.048)
Ages 31-35 0.145** 0.084 0.125** 0.120** 0.221*** 78,369
(0.054) (0.061) (0.057) (0.051) (0.045)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
aTreatment effects from estimating equation (3.9) on each birth cohort in a separate regression. Data for the years 1999 to 2018.
Treated women are women in CA-PFL who are classified as having been exposed to CA-PFL (see Table 3.7). Column (1) uses
a treatment age threshold of 22; Column (2) uses a treatment age threshold of 23; Column (3) uses a treatment age threshold
of 24; Column (4) uses a treatment age threshold of 25; Column (5) uses a treatment age threshold of 26. Observations in
NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC are dropped. Standard errors are reported below regression estimates and are clustered at the state
level. Control variables include: age dummies, race, marital status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year
unemployment rates. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
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similarly to the way in which the first treatment group is defined; as women in California
who are below a certain age threshold at the time of the awareness campaign. Just as for
the first treatment, I use five different treatment classifications (≤ 22,≤ 23,≤ 24,≤ 25, and
≤ 26). Table 3.11 shows the age ranges for treated individuals in the two years after the
awareness campaign for each of the five treatment classifications.
Table 3.11: Treatment Classification: CA Women Exposed to the Awareness Campaign
≤ 22 ≤ 23 ≤ 24 ≤ 25 ≤ 26
Year Ages Sample Ages Sample Ages Sample Ages Sample Ages Sample
2017 18-22 370 18-23 429 18-24 495 18-25 552 18-26 625
2018 18-23 374 18-24 436 18-25 501 18-26 577 18-27 638
Total = 744 Total = 865 Total = 996 Total = 1,129 Total = 1,263
Finally, the analysis with a second treatment period for the awareness campaign is re-
peated with the modified treatment classification for both pooled ages and age cohorts.
The treatment classification varies by both the first treatment and second treatment so to
maximize consistency and simplify exhibition, I present results for each of the five treatment
classifications where each given specification uses the same age threshold for both treatments.
Results for the pooled regressions are presented in Table 3.12.
Examining the results in Table 3.12, and calculating the effect of CA-PFL on schooling for
18-year old women for each of the five specifications, CA-PFL has a statistically significant
negative effect on schooling (calculated treatment effects are -0.036, -0.038, -0.081, -0.066,
and -0.103 for specifications 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively). For 35-year old women, CA-PFL
has a statistically significant positive effect on schooling (calculated treatment effects are
0.10, 0.115, 0.14, 0.206, and 0.254 for specfications 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively). These
estimates are consistent with previous estimates that found small negative effects of CA-PFL
for younger women and larger positive effects for 35-year old women.
On the other hand, calculating the effects of the awareness campaign on schooling for 18-
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Table 3.12: The Effects of CA-PFL and the Awareness Campaign on Schooling, Pooled Ages,
Modified Treatment
≤ 22 ≤ 23 ≤ 24 ≤ 25 ≤ 26
Dependent Variable: Years of educationa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressors:
TREAT × POST1 -0.180** -0.200*** -0.315*** -0.354*** -0.481***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053)
TREAT × POST2 -0.234 -0.014 0.320** 0.357** 0.303**
(0.146) (0.136) (0.131) (0.124) (0.123)
Age × TREAT × POST1 0.008** 0.009** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.03) (0.002)
Age × TREAT × POST2 0.011 0.000 -0.016** -0.018*** -0.016**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 267,660
aRegression results from estimating equation (3.10) on women ages 18 to 35 in the U.S. for the years 1999 to 2018. There
are two treatments. For the first (CA-PFL), treated women are women in CA who are classified as having been exposed to
CA-PFL (see Table 3.7). For the second (Awareness Campaign (AC)), treated women are women in CA who are classified as
having been exposed to the awareness campaign (see Table 3.11). Column (1) uses a treatment age threshold of 22 for both
treatments; Column (2) uses a treatment age threshold of 23 for both treatments; Column (3) uses a treatment age threshold
of 24 for both treatments; Column (4) uses a treatment age threshold of 25 for both treatments; Column (5) uses a treatment
age threshold of 26 for both treatments. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC are dropped. Each column pertains to a
different specification as explained in the text. Standard errors are reported below regression estimates and are clustered at the
state level. Control variables include: age dummies, race, marital status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year
unemployment rates. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
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year olds and 35-year olds, the signs flip for specifications 3, 4, and 5. Calculated treatment
effects for 18-year olds are -0.036, -0.014, 0.032, 0.033, and 0.015 for specifications 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 respectively, and for 35-year olds are 0.151, -0.014, -0.240, -0.273, and -0.257
for specifications 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. While this appears to be inconsistent with
previous estimates, it should be kept in mind that as shown in Table 3.11, even using the
treatment classification with the highest age threshold, the oldest treated individuals are
only 27 years old. Thus, there are no 35-year old women who are classified as treated for the
second treatment. In light of the previous regression estimates that taken together point to
negative effects or no effects for younger women, it may be the case that the estimates for
the effects of the awareness campaign reflect effects on a younger population, and may not
necessarily be extrapolated to an older population that is not represented in the sample.
Results for the analysis by age cohort are presented in Table 3.13. Repeating the analysis
by age cohort, it appears that estimates go from negative to positive moving from younger
to older age cohorts and higher treatment age thresholds, which is consistent with previous
results. Also, the positive effects of CA-PFL appear to be driven by age cohorts 22 to 26, 23
to 27, and 24 to 28; the regression results indicate that CA-PFL led to an increase of 0.063,
0.095, 0.126 years of schooling for each of these age cohorts respectively, using the fourth
treatment classification with an age threshold of 25. Interestingly, effects for the awareness
campaign are negative across the board, except for the 27 to 31 age cohort which has a
statistically significant positive effect that indicates that the awareness campaign led to 0.430
additional years of schooling for this age group. These results suggest that the awareness
campaign effect may in fact be capturing delayed effects of CA-PFL. Because of the way in
which the modified treatment is defined, the individuals classified as having been exposed to
the awareness campaign are 27 at most using the highest age threshold and the most recent
year of data in 2018. Thus, the regressions can only be estimated for cohorts containing
individuals who are 27 years or younger. In light of the previous analyses which indicated
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF CA-PFL ON SCHOOLING AND FERTILITY 109
that younger individuals were negatively affected by CA-PFL and that older individuals were
positively affected by CA-PFL, it may be the case that the estimates presented in Table 3.13















































Table 3.13: The Effects of CA-PFL and the Awareness Campaign on Schooling, Age Cohorts, Modified Treatment
≤ 22 ≤ 23 ≤ 24 ≤ 25 ≤ 26
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Years of educ.a CA-PFL AC CA-PFL AC CA-PFL AC CA-PFL AC CA-PFL AC Sample Size
Age Cohort:
Ages 18-22 -0.045** -0.018 71,232
(0.026) (0.045)
Ages 19-23 -0.028 -0.080** -0.025 -0.021 70,372
(0.026) (0.046) (0.027) (0.045)
Ages 20-24 -0.035 -0.253*** -0.013 -0.100* 0.012 -0.009 71,043
(0.025) (0.061) (0.025) (0.056) (0.025) (0.054)
Ages 21-25 -0.004 -0.342*** 0.020 -0.201** 0.030 -0.079 0.061** -0.019 71,751
(0.028) (0.067) (0.026) (0.064) (0.026) (0.063) (0.026) (0.061)
Ages 22-26 -0.042 -0.299*** -0.004 -0.204*** 0.034 -0.133** 0.063** -0.041 0.080** -0.064 72,121
(0.041) (0.052) (0.037) (0.050) (0.032) (0.052) (0.031) (0.055) (0.030) (0.056)
Ages 23-27 -0.015 0.176** 0.007 -0.089* 0.034 -0.120** 0.095** -0.089 0.092** -0.036 72,412
(0.049) (0.071) (0.045) (0.050) (0.040) (0.055) (0.036) (0.061) (0.035) (0.060)
Ages 24-28 0.034 -0.173** 0.032 -0.251*** 0.126*** -0.226*** 0.110** -0.177** 73,210
(0.049) (0.053) (0.043) (0.056) (0.036) (0.065) (0.033) (0.068)
Ages 25-29 0.011 -0.529*** 0.097** -0.328*** 0.059 -0.240*** 73,822
(0.053) (0.070) (0.042) (0.068) (0.039) (0.067)
Ages 26-30 0.093** -0.395*** 0.045 -0.267*** 74,713
(0.044) (0.092) (0.039) (0.073)






Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
aTreatment effects from estimating equation (3.10) on each birth cohort in a separate regression. Data for the years 1999 to 2018. There are two treatments. For the first
(CA-PFL), treated women are women in CA-PFL who are classified as having been exposed to CA-PFL (see Table 3.7). For the second (awareness campaign (AC)),
treated women are women who are classified as having been exposed to the awareness campaign (see Table 3.11). Column (1) uses a treatment age threshold of 22 for
both treatments; Column (2) uses a treatment age threshold of 23 for both treatments; Column (3) uses a treatment age threshold of 24 for both treatments; Column
(4) uses a treatment age threshold of 25 for both treatments; Column (5) uses a treatment age threshold of 26 for both treatments. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY,
and DC are dropped. For each specification, the first column gives the CA-PFL treatment effect and the second column gives the awareness campaign treatment effect
for age cohorts that contain individuals that are classified as having been exposed to the awareness campaign. Standard errors are reported below regression estimates
and are clustered at the state level. Control variables include: age dummies, race, marital status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year unemployment
rates. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
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3.4.5 The Effects of CA-PFL on School Enrollment
To further understand the schooling results, I also estimate the effect of CA-PFL on school
enrollment (in high school (full- or part-time) and in college (full- or part-time), and in
school). The CPS asks all 16 to 24 year olds being interviewed about their enrollment
status. Since, I do not have data on school enrollment past age 24, I cannot fully capture
the story about how CA-PFL may have impacted school enrollment at older ages, which is
what would be most informative given the previous findings on years of schooling.
Results are presented in Table 3.14. The first column uses a binary variable for whether
the individual reports being enrolled either part-time or full-time in high school, the second
column uses a binary variable for whether the individual reports being enrolled either part-
time or full-time in college, and the third column uses a binary variable for whether the
individual reports being in school at all. For the first specification, the sample is limited to
individuals ages 18 to 20, for the second specification the sample is limited to women ages
19 to 24, and for the third specification, the sample includes all women ages 18 to 24. These
regressions are simplified difference-in-difference regressions that do not include age and
treatment interactions (in other words, the models include TREAT, POST and TREAT ×
POST terms as well as the usual controls but does not have the other interaction terms).
The coefficients on the relevant treatment variables in the second and third specifications
are not statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient on the TREAT ×POST
variable in the first specification is -0.020 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
This indicates that CA-PFL had a statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood of
enrollment in high school. While this analysis is limited by the narrow range of ages available
in the data, it does provide results that are somewhat consistent with what was previously
found in that effects for young women may be small and insignificant or negative.
Further examining the effects of CA-PFL on school enrollment in a separate regression for
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Table 3.14: The Effects of CA-PFL on School Enrollment, Pooled Ages
In High Schoola In College In School
Dependent Variable: In school (1) (2) (3)
Regressors:
TREAT × POST -0.020*** 0.000 -0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N = 42,827 84,865 99,892
aRegression results from estimating an equation akin to (3.9) (where the dependent variable is now a binary for in school status
and there are no age interaction terms) on women ages 18 to 24 in the U.S. for the years 1999 to 2018. The first column pertains
to the specification that uses the binary variable ”in high school” as the outcome variable. The second column pertains to the
specification that uses the binary variable ”in college” as the outcome variable. The third column pertains to the specification
that uses the binary variable ”in school” as the outcome variable. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC are dropped.
Standard errors are reported below regression estimates and are clustered at the state level. Control variables include: age
dummies, race, marital status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year unemployment rates. * P < 0.10, ** P
< 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
each age, I once again find evidence of negative effects. Results are presented in Table 3.15.
While not all estimated effects are statistically significant, those that are are all negative for
high school enrollment, college enrollment, and general enrollment indicating the CA-PFL
reduced the likelihood of being enrolled in school for certain ages under 24. These results
are consistent with results from the years of schooling analyses which found negative effects
for younger individuals. It would be informative to repeat the school enrollment analysis for
older individuals but given the limitations of the data, this cannot be done in the present
study.
Taken together, the results from the years of schooling and the school enrollment analyses
suggest that CA-PFL had a negative effects on schooling for younger women but positive
effects for older women. The finding that the effects are different at different ages can
indicate one of two things: Either, CA-PFL led women to delay schooling or there is simply
heterogeneity in the way women’s schooling responds to CA-PFL across the age distribution.
The former interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the analyses using the modified
treatment classification also find negative effects for younger individuals and positive effects
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Table 3.15: The Effects of CA-PFL on School Enrollment, by Age
In High Schoola In College In School
Dependent Variable: In school (1) (2) (3) Sample Size
Age:
Age 18 -0.044** -0.037*** 15,027
(0.013) (0.010)
Age 19 -0.021*** -0.007 -0.028** 13,822
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Age 20 0.007* 0.003 0.010 13,978
(0.004) (0.014) (0.012)
Age 21 0.013 0.008 14,158
(0.012) (0.012)
Age 22 0.005 0.007 14,247
(0.012) (0.013)
Age 23 -0.034*** -0.041*** 14,167
(0.010) (0.009)
Age 24 0.002 0.002 14,493
(0.010) (0.010)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
aRegression results from estimating an equation akin to (3.9) (where the dependent variable is now a binary for in school status
and there are no age interaction terms) on women ages 18 to 24, at each age in the U.S. for the years 1999 to 2018. The first
column pertains to the specification that uses the binary variable ”in high school” as the outcome variable. The second column
pertains to the specification that uses the binary variable ”in college” as the outcome variable. The third column pertains to
the specification that uses the binary variable ”in school” as the outcome variable. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC
are dropped. Standard errors are reported below regression estimates and are clustered at the state level. Control variables
include: race, marital status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year unemployment rates. * P < 0.10, ** P <
0.05, *** P < 0.001.
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for older individuals. Also, the interpretation that women delayed schooling is consistent with
the human-capital model and indicates that CA-PFL may have been effective in increasing
women’s expectations about labor force participation, thereby increasing optimal schooling
investments. Furthermore, this is consistent with CA-PFL increasing returns to working
(perhaps by compensating women for time off, or by providing women flexibility to juggle
family and work), thereby leading some women to delay schooling. Further bolstering this
interpretation is the complementary analysis in Chapter 2 in which the effect of CA-PFL
on employment is estimated. While that analysis does not stratify the sample by age, the
results overall suggest that women’s labor force participation did increase at the extensive
margin, which is consistent with women delaying schooling and choosing to work instead.
3.4.6 The Effects of CA-PFL on Fertility
Because of the well-documented link between fertility and schooling (see for example, Goldin
and Katz, 2002), I also examine the impact of the policy on fertility. If CA-PFL led women
to delay schooling, it is not implausible that the program also impacts fertility decisions. I
examine whether CA-PFL changed the probability of being a parent (i.e. of having one or
more children) using a similar model as the one described in the schooling context. Control
variables are the same as in the schooling model except I leave out number of children. Once
again, the sample is limited to women ages 18 to 35. Results for the pooled age sample
are shown in Table 3.16. The estimated coefficient on the TREAT × POST indicator is
-0.045 which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and the estimated coefficient
on the treatment effect interacted with age is 0.001 which is statistically significant at the
1 percent level. Calculating the treatment effect at various ages, CA-PFL has a negative
effect on fertility, and the effect decreases in magnitude with age. For example, 18-year old
women post-CA-PFL are 2.7 percentage points less likely to be parents, 28-year old women
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are 1.7 percentage points less likely to be parents, and 35 year olds are 1 percentage point
less likely to be parents. On a pre-treatment average of 45.4 percent, this implies a change
of 5.9 percent, 3.7 percent, and 2.2 percent for 18-year olds, 28-year olds, and 35-year olds
respectively.8
Table 3.16: The Effect of CA-PFL on Fertility, Pooled Ages
The effect of CA-PFL on the likelihood of being a parent using pooled ages and a general treatment classification.a
Dependent Variable: Parent
Regressors:
TREAT × POST -0.045**
(0.01)
Age × TREAT × POST 0.001***
(0.00)
Demographic Controls Yes
State fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
N = 267,660
aRegression results from estimating a regression that takes the same form as equation (3.9). The dependent variable is now a
binary variable for whether the individual is a parent or not. Data include women ages 18 to 35 in the U.S. for the years 1999
to 2018. Treated women are women in CA-PFL observed in 2005 and after. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC are
dropped. Standard errors are reported below regression estimates and are clustered at the state level. Control variables include:
age dummies, race, marital status, employment status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year unemployment
rates. * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
Further examining the effects of CA-PFL on fertility by age cohorts, estimated effects
show statistically significant negative effects for all age cohorts except the youngest two
cohorts (ages 18 to 22 and ages 19 to 23). Results are presented in Table 3.17. The magnitude
of the effects ranges from a 1.1 percentage point decline to a 4.9 percentage point decline.
Calculating the implied percentage decline from the pre-treatment averages for the treatment
group for each age cohort, the implied decline ranges from about 4 percent to a maximum
of 8 percent. These effects suggest that PFL programs may have important implications
for fertility. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the magnitude of the treatment
effects across age cohorts exhibits an “inverse U-shaped” trend. In other words, effects are
8I also estimate the effect of CA-PFL on the likelihood of being a parent for a sample of women 35 years
and older. Effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Evaluating the treatment effect for
35-year old women, CA-PFL leads to a 1.5 percentage point decline in the likelihood of being a parent. On
a pre-treatment average of 49.7 percent, this implies a decline of 3 percentage points.
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smaller for younger cohorts, increase to a maximum for the 28 to 32 cohort, and then decline
for subsequent cohorts. This indicates that prime childbearing years (which are also prime
educational and career investment years) are the most affected.
Table 3.17: The Effects of CA-PFL on Fertility, Age Cohorts
The effect of CA-PFL on the likelihood of being a parent
using age cohorts and a general treatment classification.a
Dependent Variable: Parent Sample Size
Age Cohort:
Ages 18-22 -0.002 71,232
(0.01)
Ages 19-23 -0.006 70,372
(0.01)
Ages 20-24 -0.011** 71,043
(0.00)
Ages 21-25 -0.015** 71,751
(0.00)
Ages 22-26 -0.015** 72,121
(0.00)
Ages 23-27 -0.016** 72,412
(0.01)
Ages 24-28 -0.020** 73,210
(0.01)
Ages 25-29 -0.025*** 73,822
(0.01)
Ages 26-30 -0.033*** 74,713
(0.01)
Ages 27-31 -0.038*** 75,667
(0.01)
Ages 28-32 -0.049*** 76,515
(0.01)
Ages 29-33 -0.047*** 77,129
(0.00)
Ages 30-34 -0.044*** 77,882
(0.01)
Ages 31-35 -0.027*** 78,369
(0.01)
Demographic Controls Yes
State fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
aTreatment effects from estimating a regression that takes the same form as equation (3.9) on each birth cohort in a separate
regression. The dependent variable is now a binary variable for whether the individual is a parent or not. Data for the years
1999 to 2018. Treated women are women in CA-PFL observed in 2005 and after. Observations in NJ, RI, WA, NY, and DC
are dropped. Standard errors are reported below regression estimates and are clustered at the state level. Control variables
include: race, marital status, employment status, whether the person is born in the U.S., and state-year unemployment rates.
* P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001.
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3.5 Conclusion
Taken together, the analyses of the impact of CA-PFL on schooling and fertility tell an
interesting story: CA-PFL had negative effects on schooling for younger women but positive
effects on schooling for older women, which suggests that CA-PFL may have led younger
women to delay schooling. The results also indicate that CA-PFL had a negative effect on
the probability of being a parent at all ages but had the strongest effects on women in prime
childbearing, educational, and career investment years.
I interpret the compilation of the analyses conducted on the impacts of CA-PFL as in-
dicating that while PFL programs may provide benefits along certain dimensions they may
also have other unintended consequences that need to be fully considered before implement-
ing a national program. As illustrated by the results in this work, PFL programs can have
positive consequences on labor force participation both at the intensive and extensive mar-
gins for women and mothers. CA-PFL can also lead to higher educational investments in
the longer-term which may enable women to pursue high-level careers. Furthermore, the
availability of PFL removes an unncessary constraint for working mothers and as such may
allow young women aspiring to be both mothers and employees, a workable solution without
resulting in costly alternative routes. Thus, PFL policies can be useful in creating equitable
opportunities for women which is a worthwhile goal for a moral and equitable society.
However, it also appears that CA-PFL may have unanticipated effects on fertility. While
proponents of PFL sometimes cite these programs as being supportive of family formation
and a possible policy tool to encourage higher fertility rates, the results of the analyses
conducted here indicate that this may not be the case. A possible channel through which
the negative fertility effects occur is that CA-PFL led women to invest more in schooling
and thus led some women to opt out of childbearing.
Future research on PFL ought to consider whether PFL impacts women’s choice of degree
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type, college major, and job industry. Such analyses could shed more light on whether moth-
erhood in the absence of family-friendly policies creates barriers for women and influences
women’s educational investments and professional choices. This direction of research could
inform debates on both the wage gap and the gender gap in educational and professional
fields (such as science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields).
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